EDUCATION AND MOBILITY

We show that the length of compulsory education has a causal impact on regional labor mobility. We reach this conclusion from an analysis of a quasi‐exogenous staged Norwegian school reform, using register data on the whole population. Based on the results, we conclude that part of the US–Europe difference, as well as the European North–South difference in labor mobility, is likely to be due to differences in levels of education in the respective regions.     

Facial appearance and leadership: An overview and challenges for new research

There is plenty of evidence showing that facial features predict success in politics, business and the military. Some of the papers providing this evidence are related to selection into leadership positions, others into how facial features predict performance in such a position. The purpose of this introduction is to provide an overview of The Leadership Quarterly special issue on Facial Appearance and Leadership, as well as to discuss the use of good looks as a heuristic, and difficulties related to establishing causal relationships in this area of research.     

On human capital formation with exit options: comment and new results

Katz and Rapoport (2005) conclude that with linear production technology and the possibility of unilateral migration, region-specific shocks may increase the average level of education. Previously, Poutvaara (2000) derived a corresponding result with Cobb–Douglas technology and migration which may go in both directions. This paper extends the analysis to all strictly concave production functions, and shows how the effect of the region-specific shocks depends on the shape of the production function. Also, the paper establishes when the presence of exit option increases and when it reduces investment in education. The results are robust to allowing for migration costs.     

On the political economy of social security and public education

This paper analyzes simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public education with three overlapping generations and ability differences inside each cohort. Wage tax revenue finances public education and social security benefits. The presence of ability differences introduces a time-consistency problem with repeated voting. This can be solved by trigger strategies, which do not punish upward deviations in the wage tax rate. If there are multiple equilibria, then higher tax rates are associated with more education. Surprisingly, the median voter may be a young citizen, even when cohorts are of the same size.