Voting on redistribution with tax evasion

This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax whose proceeds are redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, a voting equilibrium may not exist. When an equilibrium does exist, there are several possible outcomes. There may be ‘conventional’ equilibria where the rich are expropriated by the poor and middle class. There may be equilibria without full expropriation where redistribution is limited by the threat of evasion. Finally, there may be equilibria where redistribution goes from the middle class to the rich and poor.     

Adieu Rabenmutter—culture,fertility, female labour supply,the gender wage gap and childcare

This paper studies the effect of cultural attitudes on childcare provision, fertility, female labour supply and the gender wage gap. Cross-country data show that fertility, female labour force participation and childcare provision are positively correlated with each other, while the gender wage gap seems to be negatively correlated with these variables. The paper presents a model with endogenous fertility, female labour supply and childcare choices driven by cultural attitudes which fits these facts. There may exist multiple equilibria: one with zero childcare provision, low fertility and female labour supply and high wage gap and one with high childcare provision, high fertility and female labour supply and low wage gap.