Explicating donor trends for population assistance

Using population assistance data, this study divides donor trends for population assistance into five distinct epochs: until the mid-1960s, the population hysteria of the 1960s and 1970s, Bucharest Conference and beyond, the 1984 Mexico City conference, and the 1990s. A number of decisive events, as well as changing views of the population problem, characterise each period and have affected the sums of population assistance from donor nations. Taking a long-term view of global population assistance, the research shows that four factors account for most of the historical funding trends from primary donors: the association between population assistance and foreign aid, the role of alarmists and doomsayers in the public debate over population issues, individuals in a position of power within donor governments, and decennial international population conferences.     

Reconsidering intergenerational concerns

This article argues that most government policies towards intergenerational issues are deficient. Government attention has focused largely on environmental and economic considerations, at the expense of other concerns such as social dimensions. Some of these neglected issues, such as social inequality and generational legacies are presently hindering the formation of social capital and social development, as well as preventing individuals from reaching their full potential. These examples highlight that governments should consider a broader range of concerns within the context of reviewing the underlying intergenerational contract in each society as a result of demographic, economic and political changes.     

Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: A search for commonalities

Near‐global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post‐industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English‐speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German‐speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer‐term factors that may be common to all.     

Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: a search for commonalities

Near-global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post-industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English-speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German-speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer-term factors that may be common to all.     

Historical Population Estimates: Unraveling the Consensus

The mid‐twentieth century witnessed the emergence of a remarkable consensus on quantitative estimates of world population growth after 1650. This was the achievement of Walter Willcox, supported and modified by Alexander Carr‐Saunders and John Durand, and was endorsed by United Nations publications. It had its origins in eighteenth‐ and nineteenth‐century work, largely carried out in Germany. Willcox was particularly interested in demonstrating seventeenth‐century population growth as evidence of the global impact of European expansion, and this probably led to a too‐ready acceptance of estimates with little real basis. More recent estimates do little to shake the consensus, but extend the historical series back over two millennia or further. The article examines the strength and influence of a consensus based in the earlier period on surprisingly insecure data. It then turns to the most suspect element in the consensus, the pre‐twentieth‐century estimates for Africa. Finally, little hope is expressed that future researchers will be able to establish reliable estimates, especially for dates earlier than the eighteenth century.