Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto efficient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto efficient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule. Received: 29 June 1998/Accepted: 15 November 2000     

Activity patterns and temporal niche partitioning of dogs and medium-sized wild mammals in urban parks of Xalapa,Mexico

Urban Ecosystems - Free-ranging domestic dogs are the world most common exotic carnivore species that could negatively interact with the native wildlife as predators, competitors, and disease...     

Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties

We explore to what extent we can propose fixed negotiation rules and simple mechanisms (or protocols) that guarantee that political parties can form stable coalition governments. We analyze the case in which three parties can hold office in the form of two-party coalitions. We define a family of weighted rules that select political agreements as a function of the bliss points of the parties and electoral results (Gamson’s law and equal share among others are included). We show that every weighted rule yields a stable coalition. We use implementation theory to design a protocol (in the form of a mechanism) that guarantees that a stable coalition will govern. We find that no dominant solvable mechanism can be used for this purpose, but there is a simultaneous unanimity mechanism that implements it in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium. Finally, we analyze the case of a larger number of political parties.     

The scoring rules in an endogenous election

Plurality rule is mostly criticized from being capable of choosing an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority. This paper considers elections in which the agenda consists of potential candidates strategically choosing whether or not to enter the election. In this context, we examine the ability of scoring rules to fulfil the Condorcet criterion. We show for the case of three potential candidates that Plurality rule is the only scoring rule that satisfies a version of the Condorcet criterion in two cases: 1) when preferences are single-peaked and, 2) when preferences are single-dipped.

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Effect of childbearing on Filipino women's work hours and earnings

The effects of childbearing and work sector on women's hours and earnings in the 8 years following an index pregnancy were examined in a cohort of more than 2,000 women in the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey. Change in cash earnings and hours worked were each modeled jointly with sector of labor force participation using an estimation strategy that deals with endogeneity of childbearing decisions and selectivity into sector of work. Two or more additional children born in the 8 year interval significantly reduced women's earnings, while having an additional child under 2 years of age in 1991 reduced hours worked. Received: 16 July 1998/Accepted: 22 March 2001 All correspondence to Linda Adair. The authors wish to thank Family Health International and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for their generous support. This publication was funded by USAID under Cooperative Agreement USAID/CCP-3060-A-00-3021-00 to Family Health International (FHI). David Guilkey's participation in this paper was also supported by the MEASURE Evaluation Project also with support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under Contract Number HRN-A-00-97-00018-00. The conclusions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the policies of FHI or USAID. Helpful comments by two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. Responsible editor: T. Paul Schultz.     

A Lagrangian bound for many-to-many assignment problems

A simple procedure to tighten the Lagrangian bounds is proposed. The approach is interpreted in two ways. First, it can be seen as a reformulation of the original problem aimed to split the resulting Lagrangian problem into two subproblems. Second, it can be considered as a search for a tighter estimation of the penalty term arising in the Lagrangian problem. The new bounds are illustrated by a small example and studied numerically for a class of the generalized assignment problems.     

Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections

In the citizen–candidate approach each citizen chooses whether or not to run as candidate. In a single-peaked preference domain, we find that the strategic entry decision of the candidates eliminates one of the most undesirable properties of Plurality rule, namely to elect a poor candidate in three-candidate elections since as we show, the Condorcet winner among the self-declared candidates is always elected. We find that the equilibria with three candidates are basically 2-fold, either there are two right-wing candidates and a left-wing candidate who wins the elections (or its symmetric), or there is a right-wing candidate, a left-wing candidate, and a candidate located in between the two others who becomes winner. We also show that when four or more candidates enter the contest, Plurality rule can elect the Condorcet-loser among the self-declared candidates.      

Infrastructure Investment and Incentives with Supranational Funding

Public infrastructure investment is usually co-financed by supranational organizations. The selection of projects is supposed to be decided using the information provided by conventional cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, we show that the type of institutional design regarding the financing mechanism affects the incentives of national governments to reduce costs and increase revenues, affecting project selection, the infrastructure capacity, the choice of technology, and the type of contract used for the construction and operation of projects. With a total cost-plus financing mechanism there is no incentive in being efficient and the price charged for the use of the new infrastructure is zero, the market quantity excessive, and the level of supranational financing disproportionate. In contrast, with a sunk cost-plus financing mechanism social optimal pricing is always implemented, though there is no incentive in being efficient. Finally, with a fixed-price financing mechanism the maximal efficiency may be achieved, and the socially optimal pricing is always implemented.     

Framing Immigration News in Spanish Regional Press

In this paper, an exploratory content analysis has been developed for a case study on the topic of immigration reported in the regional newspapers of the largest Spanish autonomous community, Castilla and Leon. This study based its research conceptualization on the framing theory in mass communication. In addition to usual issue frames and issue images, two framing devices were established for analytic variables ‐‐ the index of importance and the index of affective attribute. They formed a frame package capable of making latent frames evident by their linkage to manifest frames. Comparing to the general assumption of relevant‐bad‐news production, results obtained in this study proved that, on occasion, negative news stories could be reported as less relevant than the positive ones. The outcomes also show how concept mapping of frames was applicable to immigration issues and immigrants’ visual aspects of immigrant communities that were systematically articulated and disseminated by the press in this regional society of Spain.