Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risks

Human beings have always been intuitive toxicologists, relying on their senses of sight, taste, and smell to detect harmful or unsafe food, water, and air. As we have come to recognize that our senses are not adequate to assess the dangers inherent in exposure to a chemical substance, we have created the sciences of toxicology and risk assessment to perform this function. Yet despite this great effort to overcome the limitations of intuitive toxicology, it has become evident that even our best scientific methods still depend heavily on extrapolations and judgments in order to infer human health risks from animal data. Many observers have acknowledged the inherent subjectivity in the assessment of chemical risks and have indicated a need to examine the subjective or intuitive elements of expert and lay risk judgments. We have begun such an examination by surveying members of the Society of Toxicology and the lay public about basic toxicological concepts, assumptions, and interpretations. Our results demonstrate large differences between toxicologists and laypeople, as well as differences between toxicologists working in industry, academia, and government. In addition, we find that toxicologists are sharply divided in their opinions about the ability to predict a chemical's effect on human health on the basis of animal studies. We argue that these results place the problems of risk communication in a new light. Although the survey identifies misconceptions that experts should clarify for the public, it also suggests that controversies over chemical risks may be fueled as much by limitations of the science of risk assessment and disagreements among experts as by public misconceptions.     

Poland's crisis and East European socialism

Conclusion We began this article by asking whether the Polish crisis is a socialist or a Polish disease. By citing the structural factors, we brought out the common difficulties affecting all East European societies in their political and economic development. These difficulties arose out of the transition from extensive to intensive economic growth and the consequent need to replace political mobilization of the population with their political integration. The structural contradictions occurred together with conjunctural developments in the world economy, the collapse of detente, the post-war demographic explosion, and natural calamities. Poland was least able to cope with these structural and conjunctural dynamics. The result was a society united on a national basis in its conflicts with the Party State apparatus. This conflict was never resolved by Solidarity nor by the subsequent military coup.While Poland and Romania had quite similar structural and conjunctural dynamics, it was only in Poland that the constellation of nation-specific factors yielded a societal reaction of system-threatening character. Looking at the rest of Eastern Europe, we do not see a similar constellation of factors. Rather, the combination of structural, conjunctural, and specific conditions has prevented the deeper contradictions from evolving into Solidarity-type mass movements of the Polish variety. Thus, we believe that the Polish developments will not be replicated in any of the other East European countries in the foreseeable future.Does this mean that the Polish experience is so unique that it is without relevance for the other East European states? On the contrary, the recognition of common structural problems points to fundamental conflicts in all the countries of actually existing socialism. The essence of these conflicts may be the same. It is the ability to identify and deal with them that distinguishes one East European regime from another. This ability varies with the specific and conjunctural factors as applied to each country. While there is little likelihood that the Polish disease will spread, this is partly because the other East European states are beginning to take preventive measures. In other words, they are learning from the Polish experience.There are several indicators that these regimes have learned from the Polish crisis. We can summarize them in the following predictions:First, we believe that state power and the repressive apparatus of the various East European countries will be reinforced and made more effective. This applies not so much to overt shows of force but to more sophisticated methods of social control and repression: e.g., limiting information channels, dispersing dissident groups, giving in to workers protests before they spread, taking practical measures to prevent consumer shortages from getting out of hand, and the like.Second, we can expect that oppositional forces, especially intellectuals, will be increasingly restricted in their ability to formulate and articulate system-threatening demands. The East European states will take any measures - jail, slander, internal deportation, cooptation, forced emigration - to make sure that intellectuals' contact with workers is weakened or at least strictly supervised.Third, we can expect the Eastern European states to take further measures to integrate potential system-threatening movements into the official system. We will see further attempts to improve the access possibilities for those social interests that have up to now been neglected, e.g. in physical and social infrastructures, neglected regions. Moreover, there will be renewed efforts to make the system of political socialization (education, propaganda, culture) more effective. Finally, we can expect anti-corruption campaigns within the State, Party, and industrial bureaucracies as the elites attempt to make these organs more legitimate in the eyes of the population.In recent months there seems to be considerable evidence that the East European regimes have taken all these measures. There have been attempts to re-invigorate the official trade unions. Yuri Andropov's succession was marked by a highly publicized anti-corruption campaign designed to win favor among rank-and-file workers. In Romania there have been exhortations towards more self-sufficiency and self-management, so that individual producers will be less dependent on State retail outlets, and the country less dependent on costly foreign imports. The reduction in East-West trade and decline of detente have also given more leeway for the East European repressive apparatus to crack down on dissidents and oppositional movements.With reduced trade, the economic benefits of detente no longer exist as a restraining factor on the authorities. The West now has reduced influence on domestic politics in East Europe. The combination of integration and repressive measures has so far prevented the structural contradictions from growing into true political crises of the Polish variety. Eastern Europe (and Poland) is remarkably quiet.With the broad enthusiasm fostered in the West by the rise of Solidarity, it is understandable that its brutal demise had generated parallel feelings of disillusionment. It would be erroneous to consider the Polish events as an archetype for Eastern Europe. The problems of East European regimes reflect a general system crisis (economic and political), each country's response depends on specific local conditions and fortuitous conjunctures. If the Polish events are to be understood, they must be explained as a variant in a larger East European context.Having concentrated on the crisis aspects in Poland and Romania should not blind us from the fact that these systems have an amazing ability to reproduce themselves - to muddle through. Actually existing socialism is more than simply brute force. Each of the East European societies exhibits a complex dialectic between the forces of functional stability and the forces of immanent contradictions. As such, in addition to their structural aspects, we must analyze each of these societies in their differing vulnerability to conjunctural events and in their specific political, social, and cultural characters.For those who seek to replace actually existing socialism with a more emancipatory socialism, the Polish crisis constitutes a key point of departure. It should be discussed both in terms of what it means for Poland, and for Eastern Europe. The Polish events provide further evidence that the tasks of social theory reside as much in explaining why societies muddle through as why they fall apart.     

Functional Upgrading and Value Capture of Multinational Subsidiaries

This paper investigates the relationship between the value capture of multinational subsidiaries and functional upgrading, which is defined as a diversification of employment from primary business functions to higher value adding activities such as ICT, R&D, marketing or logistics. By combining survey-based business function indicators with longitudinal accounting data for a representative sample of multinational subsidiaries located in six Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), we assess the impact of functional upgrading on foreign subsidiaries' value capture. The results provide robust evidence that the breadth as well as the scope of functional upgrading induces an upward shift of subsidiaries' value added. The effect of functional upgrading is stronger in the earlier phases after entry of the foreign investor, while the long-term growth trend remains unaffected.     

South Africa's 'Rainbow People', National Pride and Happiness

Since the first free elections were held in April 1994, South Africans are popularly known as the 'rainbow people'. The paper inquires whether South Africans who experienced pride in their nation in the first years of democracy also perceived a greater sense of subjective well-being. It is proposed that national pride in post-apartheid South Africa might be fused with or work through self-esteem to lift levels of happiness. The paper traces the history of the new integrating civil religion of the rainbow people and the acceptance of the rainbow as a political symbol of unity among the diverse people of South Africa immediately after the 1994 elections and two years later. The proposed link between national pride and happiness was explored with data from two independent national surveys, the 1995 South African World Values Survey conducted by Markinor and a June 1996 MarkData syndicated omnibus survey. The study found that the appeal of the rainbow as political symbol was inclusive of all groups in society and that feelings of national pride and support for the rainbow ideal were positively associated with subjective well-being. As indicated by intensity and frequency measures, the majority of South Africans were proud of their country and could name a national achievement that inspired pride. Better-off South Africans tended to be happier and more satisfied with life but less proud, while the poor were less happy but fiercely proud of their country. Results suggest that belief in South Africa's 'rainbow nation' ideal may have assisted in boosting happiness during the transition to a stable democracy, thereby preventing alienation among the losers under the new political dispensation. Supporters of the ideal of the rainbow nation were more optimistic than others about the future of their country.     

The queer periphery: sexual deviancy and the cultural understanding of space

The association of normative sexuality with the geographical center and sexual deviancy with the geographical periphery represents a pattern of thinking that has stayed with us in different guises throughout history. The article traces this pattern and some of its complex ramifications from the ancient Greeks to the present.     

State transition modeling of complex monitored health data

This article considers the analysis of complex monitored health data, where often one or several signals are reflecting the current health status that can be represented by a finite number of states, in addition to a set of covariates. In particular, we consider a novel application of a non-parametric state intensity regression method in order to study time-dependent effects of covariates on the state transition intensities. The method can handle baseline, time varying as well as dynamic covariates. Because of the non-parametric nature, the method can handle different data types and challenges under minimal assumptions. If the signal that is reflecting the current health status is of continuous nature, we propose the application of a weighted median and a hysteresis filter as data pre-processing steps in order to facilitate robust analysis. In intensity regression, covariates can be aggregated by a suitable functional form over a time history window. We propose to study the estimated cumulative regression parameters for different choices of the time history window in order to investigate short- and long-term effects of the given covariates. The proposed framework is discussed and applied to resuscitation data of newborns collected in Tanzania.     

Writing resistance together

This piece of writing is a joint initiative by the participants in the Gender, Work and Organization writing workshop organized in Helsinki, Finland, in June 2019. This is a particular form of writing differently. We engage in collective writing and embody what it means to write resistance to established academic practices and conventions together. This is a form of emancipatory initiative where we care for each other as writers and as human beings. There are many author voices and we aim to keep the text open and dialogical. As such, this piece of writing is about suppressed thoughts and feelings that our collective picket line allows us to express. In order to maintain the open‐ended nature of the text, and perhaps also to retain some ‘dirtiness’ that is essential to writing, the article has not been language checked throughout by a native speaker of English.