Freedom of movement vs. exclusion: a reinterpretation of the "insider"-"outsider" divide in the European Union

"This article argues that the question of free movement vs. exclusion within the European Union (EU) can be addressed satisfactorily only if we move away from the narrow state-centrism inherent in the current debate. What is required is to 'open' the state concept and examine the implications of state-society relations for EU policy making. Once this is done, it can be seen that the exclusionist stance of the immigration policy and the essentially intergovernmental nature of the policy making are due to an implicit contract between states and constituents implied by the concepts of nationality and citizenship. According to this perspective, the focus on the state or the political elite alone is too one-sided and misses the more complex factors bearing upon EU policy making in this area."     

How does Inequality Hamper Subjective Well-being? The Role of Fairness

Social Indicators Research - In this study, we aim at clarifying the role of economic inequality on the subjective well-being of individuals. For this purpose, we use more than 180,000 individuals...     

An empirical investigation of managerial achievement,job statisfaction and values: An informational perspective

Provision of appropriate information and feedback to managers is crucial for the success of an organization. This study examines the availability and desirability of various informational feedback mechanisms to a group of managers in Saudi Arabia. Study results highlight some interesting differences among managers with varying value orientations and satisfaction profiles in terms of their informational needs. Implications of the findings are discussed.     

Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey

Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electoral center. There is no empirical support for this prediction. In order to account for the phenomenon of political divergence, this paper offers a stochastic electoral model where party leaders or candidates are differentiated by differing valences??the electoral perception of the quality of the party leader. If valence is simply intrinsic, then it can be shown that there is a ??convergence coefficient??, defined in terms of the empirical parameters, that must be bounded above by the dimension of the space, in order for the electoral mean to be a Nash equilibrium. This model is applied to elections in Turkey in 1999 and 2002. The idea of valence is then extended to include the possibility that activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties in response to policy concessions from the parties. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, must balance a centripetal electoral force against a centrifugal activist effect. We estimate pure spatial models and models with sociodemographic valences, and use simulations to compare the equilibrium predictions with the estimated party positions.     

Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation

We call a domain of preference orderings “dictatorial” if there exists no Arrovian (Pareto optimal, IIA and non-dictatorial) social welfare function defined over that domain. In a finite world of alternatives where indifferences are ruled out, we identify a condition which implies the dictatoriality of a domain. This condition, to which we refer as “being essentially saturated”, is fairly weak. In fact, independent of the number of alternatives, there exists an essentially saturated (hence dictatorial) domain which consists of precisely six orderings. Moreover, this domain exhibits the superdictatoriality property, i.e., every superdomain of it is also dictatorial. Thus, given m alternatives, the ratio of the size of a superdictatorial domain to the size of the full domain may be as small as 6/m!, converging to zero as m increases.     

Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel

This article presents an electoral model where activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties. These resources are then used by the party candidates to enhance the electoral perception of their quality or valence. We construct an empirical model of the United States presidential election of 2008 and employ the electoral perception of the character traits of the two candidates. We use a simulation technique to determine the local Nash equilibrium, under vote share maximization, of this model. The result shows that the unique vote-maximizing equilibrium is one where the two candidates adopt convergent positions, close to the electoral center. This result conflicts with the estimated positions of the candidates in opposed quadrants of the policy space. The difference between estimated positions and equilibrium positions allows us to estimate the influence of activist groups on the candidates. We compare this estimation with that of Israel for the election of 1996, and show that vote maximization leads low valence parties to position themselves far from the electoral origin. We argue that these low valence parties in Israel will be dependent on support of radical activist groups, resulting in a degree of political fragmentation.