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1.
Is happiness relative?   总被引:4,自引:1,他引:3  
The theory that happiness is relative is based on three postulates: (1) happiness results from comparison, (2) standards of comparison adjust, (3) standards of comparison are arbitrary constructs. On the basis of these postulates the theory predicts: (a) happiness does not depend on real quality of life, (b) changes in living-conditions to the good or the bad have only a shortlived effect on happiness, (c) people are happier after hard times, (d) people are typically neutral about their life. Together these inferences imply that happiness is both an evasive and an inconsequential matter, which is at odds with corebeliefs in present-day welfare society. Recent investigations on happiness (in the sense of life-satisfaction) claim support for this old theory. Happiness is reported to be as high in poor countries as it is in rich countries (Easterlin), no less among paralyzed accident victims than it is among lottery winners (Brickman) and unrelated to stable livingconditions (Inglehart and Rabier). These sensational claims are inspected but found to be untrue. It is shown that: (a) people tend to be unhappy under adverse conditions such as poverty, war and isolation, (b) improvement or deterioration of at least some conditions does effect happiness lastingly, (c) earlier hardship does not favour later happiness, (d) people are typically positive about their life rather than neutral. It is argued that the theory happiness-is-relative mixes up ‘overall happiness’ with contentment’. Contentment is indeed largely a matter of comparing life-as-it-is to standards of how-life-should-be. Yet overall hapiness does not entirely depend on comparison. The overall evaluation of life depends also on how one feels affectively and hedonic level of affect draws on its turn on the gratification of basic bio-psychological needs. Contrary to acquired ‘standards’ of comparison these innate ‘needs’ do not adjust to any and all conditions: they mark in fact the limits of human adaptability. To the extend that it depends on need-gratification, happiness is not relative.  相似文献   
2.
One of the ideological foundations of the modern welfare states is the belief that people can be made happier by providing them with better living conditions. This belief is challenged by the theory that happiness is a fixed trait, rather than a variable state. This theory figures both at the individual level and at the societal level. The individual level variant depicts happiness as an aspect of personal character; rooted in inborn temperament or acquired disposition. The societal variant sees happiness as a matter of national character; embedded in shared values and beliefs. Both variants imply that a better society makes no happier people.Happiness can be regarded as a trait if it meets three criteria: (1) temporal stability, (2) cross-situational consistency, and (3) inner causation. This paper checks whether that is, indeed, the case.  相似文献   
3.
Inequality of happiness in nations can be measured using the standard deviation of responses to surveys questions. The standard-deviation is not quite independent of the mean, being zero when everybody is maximally happy or unhappy while the possible value of the standard deviation is highest when the mean is in the middle of the response scale. Delhey and Kohler see this intrinsic dependency as a problem and propose two ways to compute ‘corrected’ standard deviations. I advise against this medicine. One reason is that there is no real disease, since the presumed problem does not occur with commonly used numerical rating scales of 10 or more steps. The second reason is that one of Delhey and Kohler’s medicines have side effects, their first correction affects the mean and their second correction is based on implausible assumptions. A third reason is that there are better ways to estimate the effect happiness-inequality net happiness-level. Partialling out mean happiness did not affect the non-correlation between inequality of income and inequality of happiness in an analysis of 116 nations.  相似文献   
4.
Happiness is not the same as capability, but the matters are related. Capability is obviously required for living a happy life and happiness feeds back on capability in several ways. Capabilities affect happiness not only at the individual level, but also indirectly at the societal level. For instance: school education does not seem to make pupils any happier, but a high level of education is required for modern society that does add to happiness.Insight in the interrelations between capability and happiness is required for making policy choices. If the prime aim is greater happiness for a greater number, one must know what capabilities are most functional for happiness in the given conditions. If the cultivation of capabilities is prioritized, one must at least acknowledge the possible loss of happiness. Inspection of the available data does not reveal much conflict.  相似文献   
5.
6.
Quality-of-life in nations can be measured by how long and happy people live. This is assessed by combining data on life expectancy drawn from civil registration with survey data on subjective enjoyment of life as a whole. This measure of apparent quality-of-life is a good alternative to current indexes of assumed quality-of-life such as the Human Development Index. Data are available for 67 nations in the 1990s. The number of Happy-Life-Years varies considerably across nations. Switzerland is at the top with 63.0 years and Moldavia at the bottom with 20.5 years. China is in the middle with an average of 46.7. Happy lifetime has risen considerably in advanced nations over the last decade.People live longer and happier in nations characterised by economic affluence, freedom and justice. Together these three societal qualities explain 66% of the cross-national variance in Happy-Life-Years. Income equality and generous social security do not appear to be required for a long and happy life.  相似文献   
7.
One issue in the debate on the welfare-state is whether state-care renders society more livable or not. The positive view is that people flourish in the welfare-state, the negative view is that people thrive better without. This article approaches the dispute empirically, by comparing livability of nations that differ in state-welfare-effort. The livability of nations is measured by the degree to which its citizens live long and happily. State-welfare-effect is measured by the scope of welfare-laws and the size of state-welfare-expenditures.Data on average appreciation-of-life around 1980 are available for 28 nations; mostly rich ones. Appreciation-of-life appears somewhat greater in the nations that provide most state-welfare. However, that difference is entirely due to parallel differences in economic affluence. Data on change in life-satisfaction between 1950 and 1980 are available for only 10 nations, all rich ones. Life-satisfaction did not increase more in the nations where state-welfare expanded most.  相似文献   
8.
How do we assess how happy we are? One theory is that we compare life-as-it-is with standards of how-life-should-be. In this view, happiness emerges from a cognitive evaluation that draws on socially constructed standard of the good life. Another theory holds that we rather infer happiness on the basis of how well we feel most of the time. In that view, happiness is an unreasoned affective experience that roots in the gratification of universal human needs. One question that emerges from this discussion is whether these are really independent ways of evaluating life. If so, a next question is what their relative weight is in the evaluation. These questions are addressed at the nation level using data of the Gallup World Poll over the years 2006–2010. This survey in 127 nations involves not only a question on overall life satisfaction, but also a more cognitively focused question on how close one’s life is to the best possible and a series of questions on yesterday’s mood. Analysis of average scores in nations shows that mood and contentment are much intertwined, but also add to overall life satisfaction independently, the former more than the latter.  相似文献   
9.
Human society has changed much over the last centuries and this process of ‘modernization’ has profoundly affected the lives of individuals; currently we live quite different lives from those forefathers lived only five generations ago. There is difference of opinion as to whether we live better now than before and consequently there is also disagreement as to whether we should continue modernizing or rather try to slow the process down. Quality-of-life in a society can be measured by how long and happy its inhabitants live. Using these indicators I assess whether societal modernization has made life better or worse. Firstly I examine findings of present day survey research. I start with a cross-sectional analysis of 143 nations in the years 2000–2008 and find that people live longer and happier in today’s most modern societies. Secondly I examine trends in modern nations over the last decade and find that happiness and longevity have increased in most cases. Thirdly I consider the long-term and review findings from historical anthropology, which show that we lived better in the early hunter-gatherer society than in the later agrarian society. Together these data suggest that societal evolution has worked out differently for the quality of human life, first negatively, in the change from a hunter-gatherer existence to agriculture, and next positively, in the more recent transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society. We live now longer and happier than ever before.  相似文献   
10.
In the process of modernization, western societies became more individualistic. Ever since there have been claims that this development will create an unlivable society. Humans would need a Gemeinschaft and would wither in Gesellschaft. This classic idea lives in present day 'communitarism' and inspires pleas for the strengthening of moral bonds and preserving the welfare state. This paper reports an empirical test of the claim that quality-of-life is poor in individualized society. It compares 43 nations in the early 1990's. Individualization is measured by three aspects: 1) moral appreciation of individualism, 2) opportunity to choose, and 3) capability to choose. Next overall individualization is measured by means of an expert-estimate. Quality-of-life in nations is measured by the citizen's subjective appreciation of life as assessed in representative surveys.The data show a clear positive relationship, the more individualized the nation, the more citizens enjoy their life. This suggests that the benefits of individualization are greater than its costs. Inspection of the scattergrams shows a linear relationship. There is no pattern of diminishing returns. This indicates that individualization has not yet passed its optimum. The relationship appears to be contingent to level of education and economic prosperity. Positive correlations appear only among the most knowledgeable and prosperous nations. This suggests that the misgivings about individualization apply more to the past than to the future.  相似文献   
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