Processes Employed by Social Work Practitioners in Child Welfare for Exchanging and Using Knowledge

Organisations in the health and social services sector expend a considerable amount of energy promoting the implementation of better practices and research data use in their establishments. In the field of social work, several studies suggest that social work practitioners do not make great use of scientific knowledge and tend to favour knowledge acquired from their colleagues or through their own occupational experience. However, interactions between types of knowledge are rarely analyzed in explanations proposed by the scientific literature. Based on research conducted with social work practitioners in child welfare, this article discusses the different ways that they acquire knowledge.     

Lorenz non-consistent welfare and inequality measurement

Typical welfare and inequality measures are required to be Lorenz consistent which guarantees that inequality decreases and welfare increases as a result of a progressive transfer. We explore the implications for welfare and inequality measurement of substituting the weaker absolute differentials and deprivation quasi-orderings for the Lorenz quasi-ordering. Restricting attention to distributions of equal means, we show that the utilitarian model – the so-called expected utility model in the theory of risk – does not permit one to make a distinction between the views embedded in the differentials, deprivation and Lorenz quasi-orderings. In contrast it is possible within the dual model of M. Yaari (Econometrica 55 (1987), 99–115) to derive the restrictions to be placed on the weighting function which guarantee that the corresponding welfare orderings are consistent with the differentials and deprivation quasi-orderings respectively. Finally we drop the equal mean condition and indicate the implications of our approach for the absolute ethical inequality indices.     

Sharing beliefs and the absence of betting in the Choquet expected utility model

Choquet expected utility maximizers tend to behave in a more “cautious” way than Bayesian agents, i. e. expected utility maximizers. We illustrate this phenomenon in the particular case of betting behavior. Specifically, consider agents who are Choquet expected utility maximizers. Then, if the economy is large, Pareto optimal allocations provide full insurance if and only if the agents share at least on prior, i. e., if the intersection of the core of the capacities representing their beliefs is non empty. In the expected utility case, this is true only if they have a common prior. Received: July 2000; revised version: May 2001     

Lorenz non-consistent welfare and inequality measurement

Typical welfare and inequality measures are required to be Lorenz consistent which guarantees that inequality decreases and welfare increases as a result of a progressive transfer. We explore the implications for welfare and inequality measurement of substituting the weaker absolute differentials and deprivation quasi-orderings for the Lorenz quasi-ordering. Restricting attention to distributions of equal means, we show that the utilitarian model - the so-called expected utility model in the theory of risk - does not permit one to make a distinction between the views embedded in the differentials, deprivation and Lorenz quasi-orderings. In contrast it is possible within the dual model of M. Yaari (Econometrica 55 (1987), 99–115) to derive the restrictions to be placed on the weighting function which guarantee that the corresponding welfare orderings are consistent with the differentials and deprivation quasi-orderings respectively. Finally we drop the equal mean condition and indicate the implications of our approach for the absolute ethical inequality indices.     

Tribute to Jean-Yves Jaffray

Tribute to Jean-Yves Jaffray by the French Group of Decision Theory.     

Being a Foster-to-Adopt Parent: Experiences of (Un)certainty and Their Influence on the Sense of Being the Parent

The Mixed-Bank Program (Quebec, Canada) is based on concurrent planning principles. While the primary goal of this placement is reunification of the child with their birth parents, the low probability of this happening calls for simultaneously planning for an alternative solution, such as adoption. As a result, foster-to-adopt families have to deal with the uncertainty of the adoptability of the child and having no legal status nor control over the situation. In a qualitative study focusing on understanding how foster families from the Mixed-Bank Program develop the sense of being the parent of the child they care for, 25 semi-structured interviews with foster parents from 20 different families were conducted. As part of grounded theory methodology, a typology of profiles according to the level of uncertainty was constructed: (1) experience of certainty, (2) experience of momentary uncertainty, and (3) chronic uncertainty. This article presents these profiles and discusses the following challenges: the willingness to settle for permanence without adoption in all profiles, the link between the level of uncertainty and the assiduity of birth parents to supervised visits with the child, and the lack of power and control over the fulfillment of the goal of having or completing a family.     

Correction to: Optimality of deductible: a characterization,with application to Yaari’s dual theory

Theory and Decision -     

An Axiomatization of Cumulative Prospect Theory for Decision Under Risk

Cumulative prospect theory was introduced by Tversky and Kahneman so as to combine the empirical realism of their original prospect theory with the theoretical advantages of Quiggin's rank-dependent utility. Preference axiomatizations were provided in several papers. All those axiomatizations, however, only consider decision under uncertainty. No axiomatization has been provided as yet for decision under risk, i.e., the case in which given probabilities are transformed. Providing the latter is the purpose of this note. The resulting axiomatization is considerably simpler than that for uncertainty.