Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players

When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases.

     

Creating Ethnicity: East European Jews and Lithuanian Immigrants in Chicago

Abstract

By focusing on East European Jewish and Lithuanian ethnic groups in the United States, this paper offers a three stage model for understanding the process by which assimilating groups create their ethnicity: Stage One, ethnic community and participatory organizations; Stage Two, individual perpetuation and representational organizations; Stage Three, informal behavior and residual symbols. The model considers the impact of both cultural and structural variables, instead of treating them as rival claimants to primacy. In applying the model to data gathered in the groups' Chicago communities, we found that despite particular divergencies, both groups presented a similar response to the United States, enabling their members to maintain a dual ethnic identity beyond the tightly-knit ghetto and urban village.     

Popularity kills the Talentstar? Einflussfaktoren auf Superstargeh?lter in der NBA

The observation that top athletes earn top salaries is well known. The (controversial) debate on superstar-salaries is mainly based on the two competing but equally plausible explanations outlined by Rosen (Am Eco Rev 71(5):845–858, 1981) and Adler (Am Eco Rev 75(1):208–212, 1985). Although both authors illustrate conclusive arguments, the discussion which of these two theories is more adequate in explaining superstar salaries still remains unsolved. The present paper analyzes salary information from the National Basketball Association (NBA) to explore the effect of Rosen’s (Am Eco Rev 71(5):845–858, 1981) talent approach versus the network and media approach by Adler (Am Eco Rev 75(1):208–212, 1985). Using innovative indicators for talent (draft position) and popularity (Facebook fans) in one model, the results of our preferred quantile regression specification indicates that player talent is stronger related to earning than popularity, particularly in the upper quantiles.     

INTERMEDIATE INFORMATION,LOSS AVERSION,AND EFFORT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

The present article empirically explores the impact of intermediate information on contestants' effort. Data involving substituted soccer players of the German Bundesliga indicate only weak evidence of a negative effect of ex ante heterogeneity on effort; in contrast, intermediate information, measured by goal difference at the time of substitution, significantly affects effort. Players exert the greatest effort when their team is leading by one goal and reduce their effort when it is trailing. When intermediate information suggests the contest is already decided, players from both teams reduce effort. This behavior is in line with loss aversion, such that players weight potential losses more than potential gains and adjust their effort accordingly. (JEL Z22, J41, M54)     

THE PAYOFF TO CONSISTENCY IN PERFORMANCE

This study investigates whether firms are willing to pay higher wages to workers who demonstrate consistent performance than to those whose performance is more volatile. A formal model reflects a production technology view, assuming the law of diminishing marginal product. This model suggests that a more consistent worker produces higher expected output and therefore receives a higher wage. The test of the model uses data from the National Basketball Association. The empirical data support the model: Players whose performances were more consistent than the performances of other players received higher wages on average. (JEL D41, J31, M52, Z20)     

WHAT DRIVES SECOND GENERATION SUCCESS? THE ROLES OF EDUCATION,CULTURE, AND CONTEXT

I explore differences in intergenerational income mobility among second generation Australians—why do some communities do better or worse than would be expected from first generation incomes alone? I present a new decomposition of this exceptional income mobility, finding exceptional educational mobility drives many of these differences. Drawing on rich survey and test score data, I provide evidence that educational mobility partly reflects a role for culture—but also the wider context of migration. In particular, migrants facing higher first generation income penalties tend to aspire to and acquire more education, and see it as more important to success. (JEL J62, F22, I2)     

Little Theories and Big Problems: Chicago Sociology and Ethnic Conflicts*

Since this society is oriented toward a specific theory, I thought I ought to say something about theories in general and our little theory in particular. Let me get that off of my chest. I am not overly fond of terms like “theory” and “theorist,” both of which seem to suggest the importance of the person who claims the identity more than anything else. They are pompous terms. To the extent that we are thoughtful about what we are doing and how we are going about it, all sociologists are theorists and methodologists. But if that is all we are, then we are literally people of no substance. We have no substantial knowledge of or concern for the empirical world. The little theory we share is extraordinarily empirical. It is, as one of its most prominent practitioners called it, a “grounded theory” ( Glaser and Strauss 1967 ). I confess that several years after receiving my degree I had no real sense of what symbolic interaction was and how it might differ from other theoretical orientations. Arnold Rose enlightened me on this when he asked me to submit a paper for a new collection he was editing ( Rose 1962 ). I was pleased and flattered. Rose was a mentor of mine, and I had never before been asked to contribute to an edited volume. But I was unsure of what would be appropriate for a book about symbolic interaction. I screwed up my courage and asked Arnold: “Exactly what is symbolic interaction”” He shrugged off my ignorance, turned on his heels, and muttered over his shoulder, “It is what they do at Chicago.”     

Social Theory,Social Programs,and Program Evaluation: a Metatheoretical Note*

Program evaluation attempts to assess the consequence of deliberate efforts to intervene in ongoing social processes. Efforts to understand and explain social processes and social change constitute social theory. The evaluation of social programs provides an opportunity both to test existing theories of social change and to discover new theory. Current notions about theory in the evaluation literature are reviewed and cues from that literature provide the basis for suggested directions in the relationship between the design of programs, their evaluation, and theory.