Lumpers and Splitters: The Public Opinion Information that Politicians Collect and Use

Are the decisions of American policymakers informed by generaltrends in the public’s ideology or by the public’spolicy-specific preferences? In this article we discuss twoexplanations for the types of public opinion information thatpoliticians collect and use. Using a unique data set of privatepolls from the White House of Richard Nixon, we find that whenopinion data on specific policies were available, the presidentrelied on them and not on general ideology data. On less importantissues, however, we find that the president often chose notto collect policy-specific data and instead relied on generalideology data. The differential collection and use of informationby policymakers reflect varying strategic calculations. Theyalso have profound implications for representative democracyand the demands placed on citizens and governors.     

Statistical analysis for negotiation support

In this paper we provide an overview of the issues involved in using statistical analysis to support the process of international negotiation. We will illustrate how the approach can contribute to a negotiator's understanding and control of the interactions that occur during the course of a negotiation. The techniques are suited to the analysis of data collected from ongoing discussions and moves made by the parties. The analyses are used to illuminate influences and processes as they operate in particular cases or in negotiations in general. They do not identify a best strategy or outcome from among alternatives suggested either from theoretical assumptions about rationality and information-processing (see Munier and Rullière's paper in this issue), from personal preference structures (see Spector's paper in this issue), or from a rule-based modeling system (see Kersten's paper in this issue). This distinction should be evident in the discussion to follow, organized into several sections: From Empirical to Normative Analysis; Statistical Analysis for Situational Diagnosis; Time-Series Analysis of Cases, and Knowledge as Leverage Over the Negotiation Process. In a final section, we consider the challenge posed by attempts to implement these techniques with practitioners.     

The Polls--Review: Public Opinion Research and Support for the Iraq War

Professors Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Jason Reifler'stheory of the determinants of public support for war has receiveda great deal of attention among academics, journalists, andpolicymakers. They argue that support for war hinges on initialsupport for military action and the belief in the success ofthe war. In this review, we take a critical and constructiveview of their work, focusing on methodological concerns. Wediscuss the dependent variable used by the authors—individualcasualty tolerance—and argue that it is an insufficientmeasure of war support. We also make the case that their independentvariables of interest—initial support for war and evaluationof war success—may, in fact, be best understood as indicatorsof latent support for the war more generally. Finally, we discussthe need for more research into the determinants of supportfor war, focusing on core values and elite rhetoric as potentialvariables for continued and future study.     

Identification of a princess under incomplete information: an amarna story

This article presents four analyses of an interaction between the middle-Bronze Age Pharaoh Nibmuarea and the Babylonian king Kadashman-Enlil as described in the Amarna letters (Moran [1992] The Amarna Letters, The Johns Hopkins Universiy Press, Baltimore, Maryland). Intent on denying the Pharaoh his daughter in marriage, the Babylonian king was faced with the choice of sending messengers who could ('dignitaries') or could not identify ('non-dignitaries') his missing sister in the Pharaoh's court. Intent on marrying the king's daughter, the Pharaoh was faced with the choice of showing the sister or showing someone else. Based on the assumption of complete information (game 1), the analysis revealed a dominant-strategy equilibrium: Nibmuarea shows the sister and Kadashman-Enlil sends non-dignitaries. Based on the assumption of one-sided incomplete information (Pharaoh's misperception; game 2), the analysis revealed that the Pharaoh had a dominant strategy of showing the sister irrespective of whether the king is keen or reluctant to learn about his sister's fate. Based on the assumption of one-sided incomplete information (Kadashman-Enlil's misperception; game 3), the analysis revealed that if non-dignitaries are sent, the Pharaoh prefers showing someone other than his sister. Based on the assumption of two-sided incomplete information (game 4), the Pharaoh finds it more beneficial to present the sister irrespective of whether his intentions are genuine or feigned. With incomplete information, it is difficult to judge the other's intentions; the cost of being caught cheating by not showing the sister to knowledgeable messengers was quite high. These analyses highlight the strategic uncertainty that characterized this Bronze-Age interaction.