“Backslanted X” fertility dynamics and macroeconomics

A large number of pairs of countries exhibit a dynamic pattern in which: (1) Fertility in both countries declines across time; (2) initially, one country has a higher fertility and a lower per-capita income than the other; and (3) in time, as per-capita incomes converge, fertility rates in the poorer country become lower than in the richer one. This article documents the prevalence of such dynamics and offers a theoretical model in which these dynamics emerge endogenously. Assuming differences in the degree of utility substitution between consumption and rearing children across countries generates all three components of these dynamics.

Coexistence Is in the Eye of the Beholder: Evaluating Intergroup Encounter Interventions Between Jews and Arabs in Israel

This article presents a paradigm of process evaluation of intergroup contact interventions that has two objectives: (a) to classify intergroup encounters by their ideology and (b) to define and apply criteria that evaluate the quality of intergroup interaction, focusing on symmetry between members of both groups in active participation in the encounter. This paradigm was applied to evaluate 47 encounters programs between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs that were classified into two major approaches—those that emphasize coexistence and similarities between the sides and those that emphasize conflict and confrontation. Equality in participation of Jewish and Arab participants was found in the vast majority (89%) of programs. However, symmetry between Jewish and Arab facilitators varied and was higher in programs including confrontational elements.     

Microcosms and macrocosms: Seat allocation in proportional representation systems

Three alternative methods are proposed to determine a normative standard concerning the fair proportion of seats a party ought to receive in a representative assembly as a function of the voters' preference orderings. The methods differ from one another in their treatment of indifference relations and the assumptions they make about the type of scale underlying voters' preferences. Common to all three methods is the basic idea that the ratio between the number of voters preferring party i over j to the number of voters preferring party j over i can be tested for consistency, in a precisely defined sense, and if sufficiently consistent, can be appropriately scaled to determine the proportion of seats each party ought to receive. The proposed solutions are shown to satisfy several desiderata when the matrix of preference ratios is consistent. When there are cyclical majorities of equal size, the matrix of preference ratios is inconsistent. The main application of the proposed scheme is as a normative benchmark against which actual or proposed voting procedures can be evaluated in proportional representation systems. The theoretical implications of these solutions are briefly discussed.This research was supported by the United States - Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), Jerusalem, Israel. We wish to thank Steven Brams, David V. Budescu, and Joseph Greenberg for many helpful comments.