Mitigating disaster losses through insurance

Losses from natural disasters have increased in recent years due to growth of population in hazard-prone areas and inadequate enforcement of building codes. This article first examines why homeowners have not voluntarily adopted cost-effective protective measures and have limited interest in purchasing insurance. It then proposes a disaster-management program which utilizes insurance coupled with well-enforced building codes to reduce future damage. Banks and financial institutions play a key role in this program by requiring inspections of homes as a condition for a mortgage. New forms of reinsurance coverage against catastrophic losses from natural disasters are necessary to protect insurers against potential insolvency from the next mega-disaster.     

Catastrophe Risk Models for Evaluating Disaster Risk Reduction Investments in Developing Countries

Major natural disasters in recent years have had high human and economic costs, and triggered record high postdisaster relief from governments and international donors. Given the current economic situation worldwide, selecting the most effective disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures is critical. This is especially the case for low‐ and middle‐income countries, which have suffered disproportionally more economic and human losses from disasters. This article discusses a methodology that makes use of advanced probabilistic catastrophe models to estimate benefits of DRR measures. We apply such newly developed models to generate estimates for hurricane risk on residential structures on the island of St. Lucia, and earthquake risk on residential structures in Istanbul, Turkey, as two illustrative case studies. The costs and economic benefits for selected risk reduction measures are estimated taking account of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. We conclude by emphasizing the advantages and challenges of catastrophe model‐based cost‐benefit analyses for DRR in developing countries.     

Siting Noxious Facilities: A Test of the Facility Siting Credo

Over the past decade it has become increasingly difficult to site noxious facilities, despite the fact that there is a growing need to do so. To address this problem, a set of guidelines for a fairer, wiser, and more workable siting process—the Facility Siting Credo—was developed during a National Facility Siting Workshop in 1990. This paper presents an empirical test of these guidelines. A questionnaire based on the Credo was completed by stakeholders in 29 waste facility siting cases, both successful and unsuccessful, across the United States and Canada. Using an independent determination of outcome (success), a preliminary ranking of the importance of various Credo principles was obtained. The data reveal that establishing trust between the developer and host community is an important factor in facilitating the siting process. The siting process is most likely to be successful when the community perceives the facility design to be appropriate and to satisfy its needs. Public participation also is seen to be an important process variable, particularly if it encourages a view that the facility best meets community needs. Moreover, a siting process where communities volunteer to host facilities is an approach that holds promise for meeting many of these key success criteria.     

Insurer ambiguity and market failure

A series of studies investigate the decision processes of actuaries, underwriters, and reinsurers in setting premiums for ambiguous and uncertain risks. Survey data on prices reveal that all three types of these insurance decision makers are risk averse and ambiguity averse. In addition, groups appear to be influenced in their premium-setting decisions by specific reference points such as expected loss and the concern with insolvency. This behavior is consistent with a growing analytical and empirical literature in economics and decision processes that investigates the role that uncertainty plays on managerial choices. Improved risk-assessment procedures and government involvement in providing protection against catastrophic losses may induce insurers to reduce premiums and broaden available coverage.This article is part of a larger effort supported by the National Science Foundation on The Role of Insurance, Compensation, Regulation, and Protective Behavior in Decision Making about Risk and Misfortune. We greatly appreciate the many helpful comments and suggestions by our colleagues on the project: Jon Baron, Colin Camerer, Neil Doherty, Jack Hershey, Eric Johnson, and Paul Kleindorfer. Support from NSF Grant #SES8809299 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Attitudes Toward Managing Hazardous Waste: What Should Be Cleaned Up and Who Should Pay for It?

Hazardous waste policy in the United States uses a liability-based approach, including strict, retroactive, and joint and several liability. To assess attitudes toward these basic principles of liability, and toward priorities for clean-up of wastes, a questionnaire was mailed to legislators, judges, executives of oil and chemical companies, environmentalists, and economists. The questionnaire consisted of abstract, simplified cases, which contrasted basic principles rather than dealing with real-world scenarios. Subjects were asked how they would allocate clean-up costs between companies and government as a function of such factors as adherence to standards, adoption of best available technology (BAT), and influence of penalties on future behavior. Most subjects felt that, if the company followed government standards or used the best available technology (BAT), it should pay for only a portion of the clean-up cost, with the government paying the rest. In general, responses did not support the principles underlying current law–strict, retroactive, and joint-and-several liability. Most subjects were more interested in polluters paying for damages than in deterrence or future benefit–even to the extent that they would have "harmless" waste sites cleaned up. A bias was found toward complete clean-up of some sites, or "zero risk." Different groups of subjects gave similar answers, although more committed environmentalists were more willing to make companies pay and to clean up waste regardless of the cost.     

Compliance Strategies and Regulatory Effectiveness of Performance-Based Regulation of Chemical Accident Risks

This paper investigates the role that performance-based regulations can play in linking a firm's environmental, health, and safety concerns with their corporate strategy. The specific focus is on the performance standards required by the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) which require firms that store or use certain chemicals to develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) for reducing the likelihood and impact of accidents at their plants. Data from a series of case studies and interviews of executives in chemical firms reveal that proactive companies integrated many of the requirements of the CAAA into their management systems prior to the regulatory requirements. Most of these firms tend to be large ones. Small firms often lack the resources to implement these regulations and hence have tended to have a more difficult time with compliance.     

Why do groups cooperate more than individuals to reduce risks?

Previous research has discovered a curious phenomenon: groups cooperate less than individuals in a deterministic prisoner’s dilemma game, but cooperate more than individuals when uncertainty is introduced into the game. We conducted two studies to examine three possible processes that might drive groups to be more cooperative than individuals in reducing risks: group risk concern, group cooperation expectation, and pressure to conform to social norms. We found that ex post guilt aversion and ex-post blame avoidance cause group members to be more risk concerned than individuals under uncertainty. These concerns drive groups to choose the cooperation (and risk-reduction) strategy more frequently than individuals. Groups also have higher cooperation expectations for their corresponding groups than individuals have for their corresponding individuals. We found no evidence of pressure to conform to social norms driving groups to be more cooperative than individuals.     

Policy tenure under the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)

In the United States, insurance against flood hazard (inland flooding or storm surge from hurricanes) has been provided mainly through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) since 1968. The NFIP covers $1.23 trillion of assets today. This article provides the first analysis of flood insurance tenure ever undertaken: that is, the number of years that people keep their flood insurance policy before letting it lapse. Our analysis of the entire portfolio of the NFIP over the period 2001-2009 reveals that the median tenure of new policies during that time is between two and four years; it is also relatively stable over time and levels of flood hazard. Prior flood experience can affect tenure: people who have experienced small flood claims tend to hold onto their insurance longer; people who have experienced large flood claims tend to let their insurance lapse sooner. To overcome the policy and governance challenges posed by homeowners' inadequate insurance coverage, we discuss policy recommendations that include for banks and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) strengthening their requirements and the introduction of multiyear flood insurance contracts attached to the property, both of which are likely to provide more coverage stability and encourage investments in risk-reduction measures.     

Experimental markets for insurance

This article extends the large amount of research on double-oral auction markets to hazards that produce only losses. We report results from a series of experiments in which subjects endowed with low-probability losses can pay a premium for insurance protection. Insurers specify the price at which they are willing to assume the risk of a loss. Insurance prices approach expected value for a large range of probabilities and loss amounts. Subjects seem to realize losses are statistically independent. Prices are not affected by ambiguity about the probability of loss.