The desire for impact

This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make a firm in a competitive labor market face an upward-sloping supply curve of labor, lead workers with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different wages, may alleviate the hold-up problem in firm-specific investment, can make it profitable for an employer to give workers autonomy in effort or task choice, and can propagate shocks to unemployment.     

A solution to the constant frame of reference problem

Let some individuals selected from a population form a subgroup. Let each individual name those individuals whom he considers to be the best members of his subgroup. Based on the number of times an individual was so named, we wish to find the probability that the individual is the best. second best, third best, etc., member of the population. This paper presents a method for the calculation of such probabilities. In so doing, it also offers a solution to the constant frame of reference problem in which individuals from different subgroups must be compared.     

Old money,the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy

In a courtship game, wasteful conspicuous spending may provide information about some components of a suitor’s income. But conspicuous spending may be costly not only for the potential husband but also for the woman: it reduces the wealth of the man she may marry. In the optimal contractual arrangement, the bride’s cost moderates the threshold value of the conspicuous spending that she requires for marriage. We also find that a sound observable financial background (‘old money’) benefits both the suitor and the woman, and reduces wasteful spending on status goods. Furthermore, we analyze how a change in the intensity with which the suitor seeks the woman may affect the equilibrium pattern of conspicuous spending.     

A new theory of voting: Why vote when millions of others do

Conclusion I believe to have shown that a signalling model of voter behavior is bothconsistent with neo-classical economic theory, and in agreement withmany of the important features of the political system. I cannot provethat the theory is a correct one, only that the assumptions appearreasonable, that these assumptions lead to some testable predictions, andthat many of these predictions agree with the available evidence.The argument may appear to be discomforting to some; I often findit so. For the view here is that important decisions - war, peace, civil rights- are not made on the basis of considered judgment by the citizens.Instead, citizens realize that their votes will not matter and they there-fore do not vote to affect policy. Voters view politics as a game orentertainment; it is only one of many ways to impress one's friends orassociates, and fulfills the same function for many voters that designerjeans do.     

Complex Questionnaires

We study a principal–agent model in which the agent is boundedly rational in his ability to understand the principal's decision rule. The principal wishes to elicit an agent's true profile so as to determine whether or not to grant him a certain request. The principal designs a questionnaire and commits himself to accepting certain responses. In designing such a questionnaire, the principal takes into account the bounded rationality of the agent and wishes to reduce the success probability of a dishonest agent who is trying to game the system. It is shown that the principal can construct a sufficiently complex questionnaire that will allow him to respond optimally to agents who tell the truth and at the same time to almost eliminate the probability that a dishonest agent will succeed in cheating.     

The construction of maternal identity among Israeli mothers who are welfare clients

Dominant social, cultural, and professional discourses view motherhood as the core of a woman's identity. Thus, the identity of women who do not meet the general expectations of motherhood might be negatively affected. Specifically, mothers who are welfare clients may violate the prevailing norms concerning the maternal role. This qualitative study explores how Israeli mothers who are welfare clients construct their maternal identity. Studies of mothers who are clients of welfare services suggest that they feel blamed for being “bad” or “unfit” mothers. However, women occasionally negotiate or challenge the negative perceptions that are forced on them by hegemonic discourses of motherhood. We postulate that such women experience a troubled maternal identity that they negotiate through interactions with others. Accordingly, this study set to explore how Israeli mothers who are welfare clients negotiate their maternal identity in the context of motherhood and welfare discourses. Fourteen participants were interviewed, and the findings illustrate the vulnerability of the mothers and their strategies to construct a positive maternal identity. We discuss the findings in light of the concept of troubled identity.     

Social security and conflict within the family

A husband and wife, though benefitting from marriage, may yet misappropriate some of the spouse's assets rather than let all be saved. In a Nash equilibrium, family savings may therefore be lower than what each spouse would prefer. Social Security, which is a form of forced, secure saving, can therefore increase welfare.