Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players

When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases.

     

THE IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL CHANGE ON PERFORMANCE: THE ROLE OF TEAM HETEROGENEITY

When a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks, subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents. As a new manager is less well informed, management dismissals reinvigorate this tournament competition—but only in sufficiently homogeneous teams. We investigate this hypothesis using a large dataset on dismissals of soccer coaches, whose main task is indeed the selection of players. We find that dismissals enhance performance (only) in homogeneous teams. Moreover, we show that there is typically a negative selection bias when evaluating succession effects, which reconciles previous contradictory findings. (JEL D22, J44, J63)     

INTERMEDIATE INFORMATION,LOSS AVERSION,AND EFFORT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

The present article empirically explores the impact of intermediate information on contestants' effort. Data involving substituted soccer players of the German Bundesliga indicate only weak evidence of a negative effect of ex ante heterogeneity on effort; in contrast, intermediate information, measured by goal difference at the time of substitution, significantly affects effort. Players exert the greatest effort when their team is leading by one goal and reduce their effort when it is trailing. When intermediate information suggests the contest is already decided, players from both teams reduce effort. This behavior is in line with loss aversion, such that players weight potential losses more than potential gains and adjust their effort accordingly. (JEL Z22, J41, M54)