Unconditional government social cash transfer in Africa does not increase fertility

Among policymakers, a common perception surrounding the effects of cash transfer programmes, particularly unconditional programmes targeted to families with children, is that they induce increased fertility. We evaluate the Zambian Child Grant Programme, a government unconditional cash transfer targeted to families with a child under the age of 5 and examine impacts on fertility and household composition. The evaluation was a cluster randomized control trial, with data collected over 4 years from 2010 to 2014. Our results indicate that there are no programme impacts on overall fertility. Our results contribute to a small evidence base demonstrating that there are no unintended incentives related to fertility due to cash transfers.     

Substitution of indifferent options at choice nodes and admissibility: a reply to Rabinowicz

Tiebreak rules are necessary for revealing indifference in non- sequential decisions. I focus on a preference relation that satisfies Ordering and fails Independence in the following way. Lotteries a and b are indifferent but the compound lottery 0.5f, 0.5b is strictly preferred to the compound lottery 0.5f, 0.5a. Using tiebreak rules the following is shown here: In sequential decisions when backward induction is applied, a preference like the one just described must alter the preference relation between a and b at certain choice nodes, i.e., indifference between a and b is not stable. Using this result, I answer a question posed by Rabinowicz (1997) concerning admissibility in sequential decisions when indifferent options are substituted at choice nodes.     

The dilation phenomenon in robust Bayesian inference

Upper and lower probabilities may become uniformly less precise after conditioning. We call this dilation. We review some results about dilation, present some examples and explore the effect of Bayesian updating. Also, we show a connection between dilation and nonconglomerability. Finally, we consider the implications of this phenomenon.     

Correction to: On the equivalence of conglomerability and disintegrability for unbounded random variables

Statistical Methods & Applications -     

Why I am not an objective Bayesian; some reflections prompted by Rosenkrantz

Summary The objective Bayesian program has as its fundamental tenet (in addition to the three Bayesian postulates) the requirement that, from a given knowledge base a particular probability function is uniquely appropriate. This amounts to fixing initial probabilities, based on relatively little information, because Bayes' theorem (conditionalization) then determines the posterior probabilities when the belief state is altered by enlarging the knowledge base. Moreover, in order to reconstruct orthodox statistical procedures within a Bayesian framework, only privileged ignorance probability functions will work.To serve all these ends objective Bayesianism seeks additional principles for specifying ignorance and partial information probabilities. H. Jeffreys' method of invariance (or Jaynes' modification thereof) is used to solve the former problem, and E. Jaynes' rule of maximizing entropy (subject to invariance for continuous distributions) has recently been thought to solve the latter. I have argued that neither policy is acceptable to a Bayesian since each is inconsistent with conditionalization. Invariance fails to give a consistent representation to the state of ignorance professed. The difficulties here parallel familiar weaknesses in the old Laplacean principle of insufficient reason. Maximizing entropy is unsatisfactory because the partial information it works with fails to capture the effect of uncertainty about related nuisance factors. The result is a probability function that represents a state richer in empirical content than the belief state targeted for representation. Alternatively, by conditionalizing on information about a nuisance parameter one may move from a distribution of lower to higher entropy, despite the obvious increase in information available.Each of these two complaints appear to me to be symptoms of the program's inability to formulate rules for picking privileged probability distributions that serve to represent ignorance or near ignorance. Certainly the methods advocated by Jeffreys, Jaynes and Rosenkrantz are mathematically convenient idealizations wherein specified distributions are elevated to the roles of ignorance and partial information distributions. But the cost that goes with the idealization is a violation of conditionalization, and if that is the ante that we must put up to back objective Bayesianism then I propose we look for a different candidate to earn our support.³¹     

What finite-additivity can add to decision theory

Statistical Methods & Applications - We examine general decision problems with loss functions that are bounded below. We allow the loss function to assume the value $$\infty $$ . No other...     

Attributing emotions to false beliefs: Development across discrete emotions

Emotion false belief (EFB) is the ability to correctly predict people's emotions given that they hold a false belief (FB). Accumulating evidence suggests that EFB understanding develops after FB understanding; however, the literature presents inconsistencies in this lag. The present study investigated the development of EFB in 85 four‐ and six‐year‐olds, and systematically compared this development to FB understanding across different emotions. Controlling for verbal ability and task demands, 6‐year‐olds scored significantly better on EFB tasks than 4‐year‐olds, and 6‐year‐olds' performance was better than chance. Performance did not vary by emotion. The data supported a developmental precedence of FB to EFB. Results suggest that children's acquisition of EFB is not due solely to verbal ability, FB understanding, or discrete emotion understanding; attributing emotions to beliefs represents a conceptual change in emotion understanding that occurs holistically. These conclusions are discussed in terms of socioemotional development.     

On the equivalence of conglomerability and disintegrability for unbounded random variables

Statistical Methods & Applications - We extend a result of Dubins (Ann Probab 3:89–99, 1975) from bounded to unbounded random variables. Dubins showed that a finitely additive expectation...     

The Independence Postulate,Hypothetical and Called-off Acts: a further reply to Rabinowicz

The Independence postulate links current preferences between called-off acts with current preferences between constant acts. Under the assumption that the chance-events used in compound von Neumann-Morgenstern lotteries are value-neutral, current preferences between these constant acts are linked to current preferences between hypothetical acts, conditioned by those chance events. Under an assumption of stability of preferences over time, current preferences between these hypothetical acts are linked to future preferences between what are then and there constant acts. Here, I show that a failure of Independence with respect to current preferences leads to an inconsistency in sequential decisions. Two called-off acts are constructed such that each is admissible in the same sequential decision and yet one is strictly preferred to the other. This responds to a question regarding admissibility posed by Rabinowicz ([2000] Preference stability and substitution of indifferents: A rejoinder to Seidenfeld, Theory and Decision 48: 311–318 [this issue]).