Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution

“Randomized dictatorship,” one of the simplest ways to solve bargaining situations, works as follows: a fair coin toss determines the “dictator”—the player to be given his first-best payoff. The two major bargaining solutions, that of Nash (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) and that of Kalai and Smorodinsky (Econometrica, 43:513–518, 1975), Pareto-dominate this process (in the ex ante sense). However, whereas the existing literature offers axiomatizations of the Nash solution in which this ex ante domination plays a central role (Moulin, Le choix social utilitariste, Ecole Polytechnique Discussion Paper, 1983 ; de Clippel, Social Choice and Welfare, 29:201–210, 2007), it does not provide an analogous result for Kalai–Smorodinsky. This paper fills in this gap: a characterization of the latter is obtained by combining the aforementioned domination with three additional axioms: Pareto optimality, individual monotonicity, and a weakened version of the Perles–Maschler (International Journal of Game Theory, 10:163–193, 1981) super additivity axiom.     

梁启超的史学理论与其文艺观点的关系

本文从厚今薄古、“通古今文野之界而观察之”、政治与社会意识形态的关系。地理环境决定论等方面，论述梁启超的史学理论与其文艺观点之间的内在联系。     

Why Do Social Workers Become Policy Actors?

The study examines factors related to social workers’ involvement in policy practice by examining their engagement in legislative advocacy in Israel. Based on the three components of the Policy Practice Engagement Framework—opportunity, facilitation and motivation—the study focused upon a group of social workers who were actively involved in legislative advocacy as part of their professional job. In order to learn more about their features and the circumstances of their legislative advocacy, they were asked about their testimonies and were then compared to a group of social workers who have never participated in the deliberations of legislative committees. The sample consisted of 190 social workers evenly divided between the two groups. The findings underscore that the intersect of opportunity, facilitation, and motivation created a context that encouraged the involvement of social workers in a specific form of policy practice. The study findings emphasize the opportunity and facilitation components of the framework over the motivational.     

试论张华云潮剧喜剧的美学特色

本文从悲喜交融、同中求异,婉而多讽三大方面,对张华云先生潮剧喜剧的美学特色及语言特点作些初步分析和探讨。     

Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games

Brams and Taylor 1994 presented a version of the divide-the-dollar game (DD), which they call DD1. DD1 suffers from the following drawback: when each player demands approximately the entire dollar, then if the least greedy player is unique, then this player obtains approximately the entire dollar even if he is only slightly less greedy than the other players. I introduce a parametrized family of 2-person DD games, whose “endpoints” (the games that correspond to the extreme points of the parameter space) are (1) a variant of DD1, and (2) a game that completely overcomes the greediness-related problem. I also study an n-person generalization of this family. Finally, I show that the modeling choice between discrete and continuous bids may have far-reaching implications in DD games.     

试论格罗塞《艺术的起源》的理论成就

本文以唯物史观为指导，论述了格罗塞运用艺术人类学的方法探索艺术的起源所取得的成就及其不足，对《艺术的起源》一书的理论成就，作相对全面、客观的评价。     

Buyer–Supplier Relationships: A Case Study of a Japanese and Western Alliance

With the increasing liberalisation of markets, new opportunities are emerging for smaller firms with unique products and services to establish strategic supply relationships with larger component buyers, sometimes across normal cultural divides. For many Western SMEs, developing a long-term relationship with a Japanese buyer has been critical for success in the market. However this involves the challenge of adapting to Japanese style buyer–supplier relations, especially in the monitoring area. This article reports the observations made in a field study of such a culturally sensitive relationship between a Japanese buyer and a Western supplier, especially in areas such as differing perceptions of product features and quality, business procedures, and rewards. Difficulties and solutions that arose in the relationship are logged, and the advantages of training at all staff levels, the potentially critical role of ‘link-pin’ and the value of formalised linking processes are examined as ways of achieving congruence between the expectations of the two sides.     

Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games

We add a stage to Nash’s demand game by allowing the greedier player to revise his demand if the demands are not jointly feasible. If he decides to stick to his initial demand, then the game ends and no one receives anything. If he decides to revise it down to \(1-x\), where x is his initial demand, the revised demand is implemented with certainty. The implementation probability changes linearly between these two extreme cases. We derive a condition on the feasible set under which the two-stage game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there is first-stage agreement on the egalitarian demands. We also study two n-player versions of the game. In either version, if the underlying bargaining problem is “divide-the-dollar,” then equal division is sustainable in a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if the number of players is at most four.