Public support for the social rights and social obligations of the unemployed: Two sides of the same coin?

In light of the ever‐growing shift towards activation in European welfare states, the present article examines the relationship between citizens’ welfare generosity (i.e., support for social rights) and welfare conditionality (i.e., support for social obligations) with regard to the unemployed. Using data from the 2014 Belgian National Elections Study, we found that generosity and conditionality appear to be two sides of the same coin. The two factors are negatively correlated, and most of their respective attitudinal drivers are quite similar in strength, yet opposite in direction. In addition to self‐interest and conventionally recognised ideational beliefs, such as egalitarianism and individualism, beliefs about welfare deservingness – an explanatory factor that has remained understudied in the field – are particularly influential in shaping people’s welfare preferences. A stronger emphasis on criteria of deservingness such as control, attitude and reciprocity considerably lowers support for social rights and strengthens support for social duties.     

CONGESTION MODELS AND WEIGHTED BAYESIAN POTENTIAL GAMES

Games associated with congestion situations à la Rosenthal (1973) have pure Nash equilibria. This result implicitly relies on the existence of a potential function. In this paper we provide a characterization of potential games in terms of coordination games and dummy games. Second, we extend Rosenthal's congestion model to an incomplete information setting, and show that the related Bayesian games are potential games and therefore have pure Bayesian equilibria.     

Axiomatization of ratio equilibria in public good economies

Using consistency properties, we characterize the cost-sharing scheme arising from the ratio equilibrium concept for economies with public goods. The characterization turns out to be surprisingly simple and direct. In contrast to most axiomatic characterizations based on reduced games and consistency properties, our characterization requires that in the reduced game, the players take as given the proportions of the costs paid by the members of the complementary player set, rather than their utility levels. Received: 4 July 1996/Accepted: 28 March 2001     

Welfare state dissatisfaction and support for major welfare reform: Towards means-tested welfare or a universal basic income?

This research note investigates how people combine their views on two radically opposing welfare reforms: a universal basic income and a fully means-tested welfare state. Using data from the 2016–2017 European Social Survey, we found that support for transformative welfare reform is rooted in perceptions of the performance of the current system. The preferred direction of reform, however, strongly depends on the specific aspects of the welfare state people are happy or unhappy with. At the country-level, we show that underperforming welfare states—in terms of higher poverty rates and lower social spending—increase popular demand for transformative welfare reform, in either direction. These findings are of crucial importance for ongoing debates about the future of the welfare state.     

Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games

Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be characterized by means of consistency, one-person rationality, a version of Pareto optimality and a modification of converse consistency. It is shown that, in case of the strong Bayesian equilibrium correspondence, converse consistency can be replaced by non-emptiness. As examples we treat Bayesian potential games and Bayesian congestion games.     

Saving water to save the environment: contrasting the effectiveness of environmental and monetary appeals in a residential water saving intervention

To convince people to reduce their energy consumption, two types of persuasive appeals often are used by environmental organizations: Monetary appeals (i.e., ‘conserving energy will save you money’) and environmental appeals (i.e., ‘conserving energy will protect the environment’). In this field study we aimed to compare the effects of monetary and environmental appeals on showering habits. During two weeks we measured showering behavior in one hundred households. As compared to monetary appeals, environmental appeals were more effective in decreasing participants’ shower frequency. Interestingly, the monetary appeal was judged as somewhat more motivating to save water than the environmental appeal. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

Risk aversion in n-person bargaining

Relations between risk properties of Pareto optimal n-person bargaining solutions are studied. The (weak) worse alternative property, risk sensitivity property, and risk profit opportunity property are considered, in particular relations between these properties, and between these properties and other properties such as independence of irrelevant alternatives and individual monotonicity. A distinction is made between bargaining games where all Pareto optimal outcomes are riskless, and bargaining games where Pareto optimal outcomes may represent the utilities of lotteries between riskless alternatives. In the first mentioned case, more general results can be obtained.