A Forecast Model for Unemployment by Education

ABSTRACT We present a dynamic forecast model for the labour market: demand for labour by education and the distribution of labour by education among industries are determined endogenously with overall demand by industry given exogenously. The model is derived from a simple behavioural equation based on a strong relationship between the “strength” in the struggle for jobs of an educational group, and the change in relative supply. This relationship proves to be significant in the data. Furthermore, when used to forecast employment by education on real data, the model predicts reasonably well even for educational groups, where the initial forecast year is a change point for unemployment.     

Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities

We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma in a way that is in accordance with some recent experimental findings.