Application of load-oriented manufacturing control in industry

This paper deals with multi-stage lotsizing models for imperfect production processes. The effect of imperfect quality on lotsizing decisions and effect ofinspection errorsare taken into consideration in the proposed models. Numerical examples are presented for illustration purposes. The developed models are very helpful for justifying quality assurance and quality improvement efforts.     

Rewiring global networks at local events: congresses in the stock photo trade

Digital technologies have enabled the geographical expansion of production and the distribution of creative goods and communication. Simultaneously, the number of trade fairs and congresses has increased. This rise of temporary encounters has led to theorizations of events as marketplaces, learning sites and field‐configuring practices. This article elaborates on the metaphor of rewiring to propose and empirically demonstrate a further role of industry events for global business. Drawing on the case of the global stock photo trade, we use a unique survey to map the global network of sales partnerships as well as interviews conducted at international lead congresses to demonstrate how these events are enacted as social relays. Our findings demonstrate how temporary face‐to‐face contact facilitates long distance relationships between organizations and how it dynamically shapes the global industry network. Thus, we contribute to closing the gap between social action at the micro level, organizational linkages at the meso level and the structure of global industry networks at the macro level.     

Quantitative models for optimal rest period scheduling

Mathematical and simulation models studying work-rest schedules in a production process are developed to arrive at an optimal rest policy to maximize work output per unit time. A CSMP simulation study is used to test the sensitivity of the results for different specific cases.     

LEADING WITH(OUT) SACRIFICE? A PUBLIC‐GOODS EXPERIMENT WITH A PRIVILEGED PLAYER

We analyze two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player. (JEL C91, C92, H40, H41)