The effect of 1980s tort reform legislation on general liability and medical malpractice insurance

A large number of states adopted tort reforms in the mid-1980s to limit the dramatic surge in insurance losses and premiums. Evidence based on liability insurance data by state indicates that these reforms substantially influenced general liability insurance. The levels of losses, premiums, and loss ratios (a measure of insurance profitability) all reflected the impact of the reforms. The large-scale reform efforts in 1986 were particularly influential. Medical malpractice insurance was much less sensitive to the reform efforts.     

National survey evidence on disasters and relief: Risk beliefs, self-interest, and compassion

A nationally representative sample of respondents estimated their fatality risks from four types of natural disasters, and indicated whether they favored governmental disaster relief. For all hazards, including auto accident risks, most respondents assessed their risks as being below average, with one-third assessing them as average. Individuals from high-risk states, or with experience with disasters, estimate risks higher, though by less than reasonable calculations require. Four-fifths of our respondents favor government relief for disaster victims, but only one-third do for victims in high-risk areas. Individuals who perceive themselves at higher risk are more supportive of government assistance.     

The Relative Weights of Direct and Indirect Experiences in the Formation of Environmental Risk Beliefs

Direct experiences, we find, influence environmental risk beliefs more than the indirect experiences derived from outcomes to others. This disparity could have a rational basis. Or it could be based on behavioral proclivities in accord with the well‐established availability heuristic or the vested‐interest heuristic, which we introduce in this article. Using original data from a large, nationally representative sample, this article examines the perception of, and responses to, morbidity risks from tap water. Direct experiences have a stronger and more consistent effect on different measures of risk belief. Direct experiences also boost the precautionary response of drinking bottled water and drinking filtered water, while indirect experiences do not. These results are consistent with the hypothesized neglect of indirect experiences in other risk contexts, such as climate change.     

Status quo bias in decision making

Most real decisions, unlike those of economics texts, have a status quo alternative—that is, doing nothing or maintaining one's current or previous decision. A series of decision-making experiments shows that individuals disproportionately stick with the status quo. Data on the selections of health plans and retirement programs by faculty members reveal that the status quo bias is substantial in important real decisions. Economics, psychology, and decision theory provide possible explanations for this bias. Applications are discussed ranging from marketing techniques, to industrial organization, to the advance of science.     

Paying to improve your chances: Gambling or insurance?

Will a more risk-averse individual spend more or less to improve probabilities, say on marketing efforts that enhance the chance of a sale? For any two payoffs and starting probabilities, the answer is unfortunately indeterminate. However, interpreting gambling as increasing small chances of good outcomes and insurance as reducing small chances of bad outcomes, the more risk-averse individual will pay less (more) to gamble (insure). We find a critical switching probability that depends on the individuals and outcomes involved. If the good outcome is less (more) likely than this critical value, the expenditures represent gambling (insurance).     

Conspicuous conservatism in risk choice

We analyze the risk levels chosen by agents who have private information regarding their quality, and whose performance will be judged and rewarded by outsiders. Assume that risk choice is observable. Agents will choose risk strategically to enhance their expected reputations. We show that conspicuous conservatism results: agents of different qualities choose levels below those that would be chosen if quality were observable. This happens because bad agents must cloak their identity by choosing the same risk level as good agents, and good agents are more likely to distinguish themselves if they reduce the risk level. Our results contrast starkly with those for the case when risk choice cannot be observed.

The impact of risk sharing on efficient decision

A group of risk-averse members must choose among monetary risks and payoff-sharing rules. Departure from the status quo requires unanimous consent. Such groups drill for oil, bail out nations, and make hostile takeover bids. Assume agreement on probabilities. As is well known, if all members have identically shaped HARA utility functions, efficient group act-choices follow another such function independently of payoff sharing. We show that all other groups inevitably have complex efficient behavior, accepting gambles among individually unacceptable lotteries in almost every status quo position. We also develop proper risk aversion for groups, and treat disagreement on probabilities.Support of the Associates of the Harvard Business School (Pratt) and the Business and Government and Energy and Environmental Policy Centers (Zeckhauser) is gratefully acknowledged. We received helpful comments from Scott Johnson, Mark Machina, and a referee. Jay Patel provided assistance beyond the call of collegiality.     

The disgust-promotes-disposal effect

Individuals tend toward status quo bias: preferring existing options over new ones. There is a countervailing phenomenon: Humans naturally dispose of objects that disgust them, such as foul-smelling food. But what if the source of disgust is independent of the object? We induced disgust via a film clip to see if participants would trade away an item (a box of unidentified office supplies) for a new item (alternative unidentified box). Such “incidental disgust” strongly countered status quo bias. Disgusted people exchanged their present possession 51% of the time compared to 32% for people in a neutral state. Thus, disgust promotes disposal. A second experiment tested whether a warning about this tendency would diminish it. It did not. These results indicate a robust disgust-promotes-disposal effect. Because these studies presented real choices with tangible rewards, their findings have implications for everyday choices and raise caution about the effectiveness of warnings about biases.     

Dopamine and risk choices in different domains: Findings among serious tournament bridge players

We explore how risk-taking in the card game contract bridge, and in a financial gamble, correlate with variation in the dopamine receptor D4 gene (DRD4) among serious tournament bridge players. In bridge risk-taking, we find significant interactions between genetic predisposition and skill. Among men with the 7-repeat allele of DRD4, namely 7R + men, those with more bridge skill take more good risks and fewer bad risks, while the opposite is found for less-expert 7R + men. Conversely, skill does not predict risk-taking among men without the 7R + allele. Consistent with some prior studies, we also find that 7R + men take more risk in the financial gamble. We find no relationship between 7R + and either risk measure among our female subjects. Our results suggest that the dopamine system plays an important role in individual differences in risk-taking among men, and is the first to distinguish between advantageous and disadvantageous risk-taking.     

Action Bias and Environmental Decisions

Individuals have a penchant for action, often for good reasons. But action bias arises if that penchant is carried over to areas where those reasons do not apply, hence is nonrational. Action bias is explored theoretically, and then empirically, using data from surveys of hypothetical environmental decisions. Quite apart from agency considerations, individuals like to affect outcomes when gains are reaped. Given the ability to help one of two sites, we find that decision makers choose to foster improvement rather than prevent deterioration, despite framing that makes it arbitrary which site is improved, which preserved. Strong action bias—individuals choosing to reap gains even though they must impose losses—is also observed. These concepts are related to loss aversion, status quo bias, omission bias for losses, and bright-line behavior.