工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

党委核心作用推动企业发展

南京中央商场股份有限公司是一家在海内外享有盛誉的老字号大型商业企业。在激烈的市场竞争形势下，中央商场始终保持旺盛的斗志，近6年来已由5万平方米的单体店发展成为拥有9家连锁百货店、3家连锁超市、20万平方米商业地产项目，总经营面积超过32万平方米的综合性商业企业集团。     

行游庐山西海

很偶然的机会,在论坛上得知《大江周刊》征驴友体验式采访庐山西海的消息。我们抱着试试的心情,报名参加了此次活动。“庐山西海”,名字听上去很美。庐山有海吗?上网一查才知道它是九江新整合而成的一个综合景区,主要包括国际温泉度假村、长野源峡谷漂流、桃花溪(仙女峡)漂流、柘林湖景区、云居山景区等几个地方。由于时间较紧,(只有二天的行程),我们的线路只安排了西海国际温泉度假村、桃花溪(仙女峡)漂流和柘林湖三个地方。     

既有建筑节能改造市场发展政策主体互动关系分析——基于政策网络视角

笔者以政策网络为研究视域,对既有建筑节能改造市场发展政策进行实证分析,在分析政策主体构成的基础上.深入剖析政策主体互动关系,建立既有建筑节能改造市场发展政策网络主体互动关系模型,得出政策目标分歧、政策主体不协同、政策效果反馈失效等政策网络阻隔成因,进而提出政策目标协同、第三方主体联动和搭建政策信息平台等既有建筑节能改造市场发展政策优化建议.     

基于模糊物元的建筑节能改造项目风险共担效益评价

为探索建筑节能改造项目风险共担综合效益评价方法，引入模糊物元方法对项目风险共担综合效益进行综合评价。笔者在对建筑节能改造项目风险共担效益评价目标进行综合分析的基础上，构建了建筑节能改造项目风险共担效益评价物元可拓模型，并通过算例分析对模型进行计算验证，利用指标权重与欧氏贴近度对方案进行了评价优选。该方法避免了风险共担效益多指标间相互矛盾的现实问题，直观全面地衡量了建筑节能改造项目风险共担综合效益水平，对建筑节能改造项目实现合理的风险共担具有重要的现实意义。     

完善事业单位政府采购的思考和建议

政府采购作为财政支出管理中的重要组成部分,已经成为西方市场经济国家控制和执行政府预算,加强支出管理,实施宏观调控的一种行之有效的手段。本文就政府采购的相关问题进行了阐述。