The minimal overlap rule revisited

This paper provides an analysis of the Minimal Overlap Rule, a solution for bankruptcy problems introduced by O’Neill (1982). We point out that this rule can be understood as a composition of Ibn Ezra’s proposal and the recommendation given by the Constrained Equal Loss Rule. Following an interpretation of bankruptcy problems in terms of TU games, we show that the Minimal Overlap Value is the unique solution for bankruptcy games which satisfies Anonymity and Core Transition Responsiveness.     

Controlling shareholders and the composition of the board: special focus on family firms

This article analyses the relevance of the agency problems that exist between shareholders and managers (type I agency problems) and between majority and minority shareholders (type II agency problems), in determining the composition of the board of directors, differentiating between family owned and non-family owned firms. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 173 Spanish listed companies for the period 2004–2011. The results of our study indicate that, on one hand, as type I agency problems increase, firms increase their percentage of outside directors and, on the other, as type II agency problems increase, firms increase the ratio of independent to nominee directors. Whether the company is a family firm or not does moderate the influence of insider ownership over the composition of the board. Generally speaking, our findings support the view that firms configure their board of directors in such a way as to best signal to the market both efficient management and a balance of the interests of all shareholders. Likewise, these results could be taken into account when formulating recommendations on the composition of the board of directors.     

Ownership structure and board composition in a high ownership concentration context

Few articles have addressed the relation between the ownership structure and the composition of the boards. The results of the analysis performed on a sample of Spanish listed companies for the period 2004–2011, show that in markets where corporate ownership is highly concentrated, it is necessary to devote special attention to blockholders and to differentiate the figure of the independent directors from the group of outsiders. The results confirm a negative and decreasing relation between blockholders and the percentage of independents while insiders’ ownership is only significant if one looks at the percentage of outsiders as a whole, in which case it shows a U-shaped quadratic relation.     

Species composition,abundance and diet of a squamate assemblage from the Carnaval stream headwaters (Buenos Aires,Argentina)

Urban Ecosystems - The present work summarizes 10 years of field observations of an exurban squamate assemblage occupying a 1200 ha patch in the suburbs of La Plata City (Los...     

The Characteristics of Takeover Targets: The Spanish Experience 1991–1997

In this paper we analyse the characteristicspresented by Spanish firms that have been thesubject of takeover bids that allow them to bedifferentiated from other firms. To that end,we use a sample made-up of 69 non-financialfirms that were the subject of takeover bids inSpain during the period 1991–1997, togetherwith a further 69, selected randomly on anindustrial and time basis, that were not. Theresults show that the firms that were subjectto a takeover bid were not, in general,characterised by having lower profitability ora worse market valuation than other firmsoperating in the same sector. This resultmakes it difficult to argue that takeovers inSpain have in their majority been driven bydisciplinary or speculative motives. Bycontrast, certain variables that exert aninfluence over the cost of the transaction,such as the size and the ownership structure ofthe firm, do appear to play a relevant role inthe selection of the target on the part of thebidding firm.     

Fair student placement

We revisit the concept of fairness in the Student Placement framework. We declare an allocation as \(\upalpha \)-equitable if no agent can propose an alternative allocation that nobody else might argue to be inequitable. It turns out that \(\upalpha \)-equity is compatible with efficiency. Our analysis fills a gap in the literature by giving normative support to the allocations improving, in terms of efficiency, the Student Optimal Stable allocation.     

Where are the turtles when they are not? Underwater refuges used by Hydromedusa tectifera COPE, 1869 in a suburban stream

Urban Ecosystems - Habitat requirements of Hydromedusa tectifera from an urban impacted stream from the Buenos Aires province, the Rodriguez stream, are here studied. We describe the type of...     

Coalition Formation and Stability

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player’s payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals’ preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.