Dynamic Updating of Labour Force Estimates: JARES

Abstract. In this paper a new algorithm is proposed in order to produce an automatic dynamic compound estimator of the labour force based on an interactive scheme. The proposed algorithm, JARES, is based on the probability estimator of Jaynes based on the notion of maximum entropy of a given probability distribution with a constraint on the average of an external information. The iterative scheme is based on the solution of a set of linear equations which represent the algebraic relationships between the weights and the estimates.     

Dual class shares,board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

This study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.     

Poverty in People with Disabilities: Indicators from the Capability Approach

People with disability are particularly exposed to poor living conditions: on one hand they have more difficulties in getting an income cause to their inabilities, on the other hand conditions of poverty increase the risk of disability. However, little rigorous quantitative research has been undertaken to measure the real impact of disability on poverty. Methods based on monetary set (income and consumption) may not reflect the real possibility to convert resources into the fulfilment of personal goals. The capability approach, developed by A. K. Sen, offers a useful framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being considering both monetary and non-monetary resources. The study describes a methodology, derived from the capability approach, to estimate the additional income needed for various types of household with and without disabled members to ensure the same satisfaction with economic resources. The method has been applied to the Italian contest, where 2.6 million people with disability live, and then the results are compared with the findings from an analogous study conducted in UK. The study reveals that disabled people in Italy need an income level two times higher to enjoy the same level of economic satisfaction, while in UK 50% of extra resource are sufficient. The findings suggests that traditional evaluations based on consumption lead to an underestimation of the needs of household containing disabled members. It follows that the financial benefits envisaged by actions planned by government through current instruments may not be completely effective.     

Bayesian estimation and case influence diagnostics for the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model

In recent years, there has been considerable interest in regression models based on zero-inflated distributions. These models are commonly encountered in many disciplines, such as medicine, public health, and environmental sciences, among others. The zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model has been typically considered for these types of problems. However, the ZIP model can fail if the non-zero counts are overdispersed in relation to the Poisson distribution, hence the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model may be more appropriate. In this paper, we present a Bayesian approach for fitting the ZINB regression model. This model considers that an observed zero may come from a point mass distribution at zero or from the negative binomial model. The likelihood function is utilized to compute not only some Bayesian model selection measures, but also to develop Bayesian case-deletion influence diagnostics based on q-divergence measures. The approach can be easily implemented using standard Bayesian software, such as WinBUGS. The performance of the proposed method is evaluated with a simulation study. Further, a real data set is analyzed, where we show that ZINB regression models seems to fit the data better than the Poisson counterpart.     

The price for information about probabilities and its relation with risk and ambiguity

In this article, ambiguity attitude is measured through the maximum price a decision maker is willing to pay to know the probability of an event. Two problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an act: in one case, buying information implies playing a lottery, while, in the other case, buying information gives also the option to avoid playing the lottery. In both decision settings, relying on the Choquet expected utility model, we study how the decision maker??s risk and ambiguity attitudes affect the reservation price for ambiguity resolution. These effects are analyzed for different levels of ambiguity of the act. Operating instructions for the elicitation of the reservation price for ambiguity resolution in an experimental setting are provided at the end of the article.     

Games Played Through Agents

We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by the agent. We characterize pure‐strategy equilibria and we provide conditions—in terms of game balancedness—for the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient outcome. Games played through agents display a type of strategic inefficiency that is absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent.