ON THE NATURE OF RECIPROCAL MOTIVES

Data from 692 subjects in 11 experimental treatments provide a systematic exploration of the existence and nature of reciprocal behavior in two-person games. The experimental design discriminates between motivations of reciprocity and (nonreciprocal) other-regarding preferences. The existence of positive reciprocity is found to be dependent on the level of social distance but not the level of monetary payoff. The larger context in which a decision is made is found to have a significant effect on negative reciprocity. These findings on payoff levels, social distance, decision context, and reciprocity have implications for both theoretical modeling and experimental design. (JEL C70 , C91 , D63 , D64 )     

WHEN ARE WOMEN MORE GENEROUS THAN MEN?

Previous research on gender differences in behavior has led to seemingly contradictory findings about generosity. From data generated by 290 subject pairs, we find that women are more sensitive than men to the costs of generous actions when deciding whether to be generous. The factors that affect the level of generosity observed in our experiments are reciprocal motivation, the level of money payoffs, and the level of social distance in the experimental protocol. The relatively greater sensitivity of women to the costs of generous behavior can explain most of the apparent inconsistencies in previously reported findings. (JEL C70 , C91 , D63 , D64 )     

AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC INCENTIVES TO SHARE KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge‐sharing arrangements are an important part of the innovation process as they help firms acquire technological capabilities, shorten development time, and spread risk and cost. A question central to the study of knowledge‐sharing arrangements is the impact of competition on cooperation. While cooperation has the benefit of avoiding duplication, it may have an adverse effect on the competitive advantage of a leading firm. Hence, firms face a difficult challenge during the innovation process while deciding which components of it, if any, to carry out in collaboration with other firms. This paper reports the results of controlled laboratory experiments which identify how the decision to form research joint ventures changes with both relative progress during the R&D process and the intensity of product market competition. The design is based on a modified version of Erkal and Minehart “Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development.” Research Paper 1038, University of Melbourne, Department of Economics, 2008. The results indicate that if expected profits are such that the lagging firms always stay in the race, cooperation unravels as firms move forward in the discovery process and as monopoly profits become more attractive. These results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions. (JEL C91, L24, O30, D81)     

TRACKING CUSTOMER SEARCH TO PRICE DISCRIMINATE

The electronic technologies of the Internet make it possible for sellers to track potential customers and discriminate between the informed and uninformed. In this article, we report an experiment that investigates the market impact of firms tracking customers and offering discriminatory prices based on search history. We find that consumers, on average, face the same prices when sellers have the ability to track customers and price discriminate as when sellers post a single price for all buyers. However, informed buyers receive lower prices when sellers can detect buyer search, whereas uninformed buyers receive lower prices when firms cannot track customers. (JEL D43 , L13 , C92 )     

FIXED REVENUE AUCTIONS: THEORY AND BEHAVIOR

In this paper, we study auctions in which the revenue is fixed but the quantity is determined by the auction mechanism. Specifically, we investigate the theory and behavior of English quantity clock, Dutch quantity clock, last‐quantity sealed bid, and penultimate‐quantity sealed bid auctions. For theoretically equivalent fixed quantity and fixed revenue auctions, we find that fixed revenue auctions are robust to all the previously observed empirical regularities in fixed quantity auctions. (JEL C9, D4, L2)     

Psychological Disturbance Following T-Groups:: Relationship between the Eysenck Personality Inventroy and Family/Friends Perceptions

Summary This study assessed the psychologically disturbing effects ofsensitivity training. Two different measures of disturbanceor distress were used, the Eysenck Personality Inventory (astandardized personality test) and a Behaviour Change questionnairecompleted by the participant and his close family and friends.The relationship between the two measures was explored. Participantsshowed increases in neuroticism as a result of training butthis was not confirmed by the participants' family and friendstwo weeks after the T-group (the most likely period of heighteneddisturbance from training). In fact, a large number of traineessaw themselves and were seen by their family, friends and childrenas slightly better able to cope with personal and family problems,more happy, better able to get on with their children and/orsignificant person/s, and better able to communicate