Women’s mobility and ‘transport-related social exclusion’ in Bishkek

This paper analyses gendered mobilities in Bishkek in the space of the most popular form of public transport: the minibus, or ‘marshrutka’. As the means by which women often access various important sites of daily life, the marshrutka itself is a site of negotiation and interaction. Utilizing theories of mobility and empirical data, we argue that marshrutkas are spaces that can give rise to two dichotomous conditions: positive marshrutka experiences may increase the social mobility of female passengers and subsequently increase social empowerment and influence, while negative ones can provide the grounds for social exclusion and gender inequality.     

Cooperative innovation through a talent management pool: A qualitative study on coopetition in healthcare

In recent years, the Dutch healthcare sector has been confronted with increased competition. Not only are financial resources scarce, Dutch hospitals also need to compete with other hospitals in the same geographic area to attract and retain talented employees due to considerable labour shortages. However, four hospitals operating in the same region are cooperating to cope with these shortages by developing a joint Talent Management Pool. ‘Coopetiton’ is a concept used for simultaneous cooperation and competition. In this paper, a case study is performed in order to enhance our understanding of coopetition. Among other things, the findings suggest that perceptions of organizational actors on competition differ and might hinder cooperative innovation with competitors, while perceived shared problems and resource constraints stimulate coopetition. We reflect on the current coopetition literature in light of the research findings, which have implications for future research on this topic.     

BayesProject: Fast computation of a projection direction for multivariate changepoint detection

Statistics and Computing - This article focuses on the challenging problem of efficiently detecting changes in mean within multivariate data sequences. Multivariate changepoints can be detected by...     

Cyclical Evolution of the Global Right

An understanding of the current right‐wing national and transnational social movements can benefit from comparing them to the global and national conditions operating during their last appearance in the first half of the twentieth century and by carefully comparing twentieth‐century fascism with the neofascist and right‐wing populist movements that have been emerging in the twenty‐first century. This allows us to assess the similarities and differences, and to gain insights about what could be the consequences of the reemergence of populist nationalism and fascist movements. Our study uses the comparative evolutionary world‐systems perspective to study the Global Right from 1800 to the present. We see fascism as a form of capitalism that emerges when the capitalist project is in crisis. World historical waves of right‐wing populism and fascism are caused by the cycles of globalization and deglobalization, the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, long business cycles (the Kondratieff wave), and interactions with both Centrist Liberalism and the Global Left. We consider how crises of the global capitalist system have produced right‐wing backlashes in the past, and how a future terminal crisis of capitalism could lead to a reemergence of a new form of authoritarian global governance or a reorganized global democracy in the future.     

CORRUPTION: TOP DOWN OR BOTTOM UP?

This article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government. In particular, we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption. We show that when the after-tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough, adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. By contrast, for high-enough public wages and/or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system, centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level. In the process, total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands.