首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   2篇
  免费   0篇
社会学   2篇
  2010年   1篇
  1992年   1篇
排序方式: 共有2条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Don't Know responses to survey questions are ambiguous becausethe same words are used by respondents to mean different things—ignorance,indecision, or uncertainty about the meaning of the questionasked. In order to clarify the meaning of such answers, surveyinterviewers are frequently trained to probe Don't Know answersat least once before the answer is considered final. We arguethat unconditional probing of Don't Know answers may not bea desirable practice, particularly as regards knowledge items.Large unintended effects on responses to four knowledge itemsresulted when two groups of interviewers, who administered thesame survey questions, probed Don't Know responses at differentrates. Strong evidence is provided in the article that the probingof Don't Know answers encouraged guesswork on the part of uninformedrespondents, giving rise to significant distributional differencesand differences in means across half samples for the affectedvariables. However, relationships between variables appear tobe largely unaffected by probing effects. In order to formulatevalid probing guidelines for interviewer training, further researchis needed to establish whether the findings for knowledge questionsgeneralize to factual questions.  相似文献   
2.
To assess the employment effects of labor costs, it is crucial to have reliable estimates of the labor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched firm‐worker data set, we estimate a long‐run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers to correct for endogeneity in the determination of wages. We evaluate the employment and deadweight loss effects of observed employers' contributions imposed by labor laws (health insurance, training, and taxes) as well as of observed workers' deductions (social security and income tax). We find that nonwage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white collars and by 53% for blue collars, with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions, respectively. Since most firms undercomply with mandated employers' and workers' contributions, we find that full compliance would imply employment losses of 4% for white collars and 12% for blue collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6%. (JEL J23, J32)  相似文献   
1
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号