Rethinking the governance of labour standards in South–South regional value chains

The growth of intra‐regional trade in the Global South begs the question of whether frameworks developed for the study of North–South global value chains can be used to study labour standards in emerging South–South networks. Critical of the structuralist approaches characterizing the literature, in this article I tackle the question of how formal and informal institutions interact to shape labour standards in South–South regional value chains. This is achieved in two stages. In the first part of the article, I build on Habermas's theory of communicative action to frame labour standards as the outcome of agents’ interactions within and across firms, politico‐administrative institutions and workers’ private and public spheres. Drawing on this framework, in the second part of the article I compare labour standards across the Kenya handbag and footwear sectors. While, in the former, interaction across informal institutions favoured an inclusive and consensual debate between workers and employers; in the latter, an overwhelming process of marketization and bureaucratization failed to provide an interactive space for workers’ concerns to be voiced and negotiated.     

Quasi‐Symmetric Graphical Log‐Linear Models

Abstract. We propose an extension of graphical log‐linear models to allow for symmetry constraints on some interaction parameters that represent homologous factors. The conditional independence structure of such quasi‐symmetric (QS) graphical models is described by an undirected graph with coloured edges, in which a particular colour corresponds to a set of equality constraints on a set of parameters. Unlike standard QS models, the proposed models apply with contingency tables for which only some variables or sets of the variables have the same categories. We study the graphical properties of such models, including conditions for decomposition of model parameters and of maximum likelihood estimates.     

PERSISTENCE OF POLITICIANS AND FIRMS' INNOVATION

We empirically investigate whether the persistence of politicians in political institutions affects the innovation activity of firms. We use 12,000 firm‐level observations from three waves of the Italian Observatory over Small and Medium Enterprises, and introduce a measure of political persistence defined as the average length of individual political careers in political institutions of Italian municipalities. Using death of politicians as an exogenous source of variation of political persistence, we find a robust negative relation between political persistence and the probability of process innovation. This finding is consistent with the view that political stability may hinder firms' incentive to innovate to maintain their competitiveness, as long as they can extract rents from long‐term connections with politicians. (JEL D22, D72, O31)     

Parameterizations and Fitting of Bi-directed Graph Models to Categorical Data

Abstract.  We discuss two parameterizations of models for marginal independencies for discrete distributions which are representable by bi-directed graph models, under the global Markov property. Such models are useful data analytic tools especially if used in combination with other graphical models. The first parameterization, in the saturated case, is also known as thenation multivariate logistic transformation, the second is a variant that allows, in some (but not all) cases, variation-independent parameters. An algorithm for maximum likelihood fitting is proposed, based on an extension of the Aitchison and Silvey method.     

FISCAL POLICY AND LENDING RELATIONSHIPS

This paper studies how fiscal policy affects loan market conditions in the United States. First, it conducts a structural vector‐autoregression analysis showing that the bank spread responds negatively to an expansionary government spending shock, while lending increases. Second, it illustrates that these results are mimicked by a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where the bank spread is endogenized via the inclusion of a banking sector exploiting lending relationships. Third, it shows that lending relationships represent a friction that generates a financial accelerator effect in the transmission of the fiscal shock. (JEL E44, E62)