Marital Conflict,Ineffective Parenting,and Children's and Adolescents' Maladjustment

Data from the 1988 National Survey on Families and Households were analyzed to examine the associations among marital conflict, ineffective parenting, and children's and adolescents' maladjustment. Parents' use of harsh discipline and low parental involvement helped explain the connection between marital conflict and children's maladjustment in children aged 2 through 11. Parent‐child conflict was measured only in families with a target teenager and also was a significant mediator. Although ineffective parenting explained part of the association between marital conflict and children's maladjustment, independent effects of marital conflict remained in families with target children aged 2 through 11 (but not for families with a teenager). With a few exceptions, this pattern of findings was consistent for mothers' and fathers' reports, for daughters and sons, for families with various ethnic backgrounds, and for families living in and out of poverty.     

Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value

A cooperative game with transferable utilities– or simply a TU-game – describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A solution concept for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of payoffs over the players in the game. Famous solution concepts for TU-games are the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value. Both solution concepts have been axiomatized in various ways. An important difference between these two solution concepts is the fact that the Shapley value always distributes the payoff that can be obtained by the `grand coalition' consisting of all players cooperating together while the Banzhaf value does not satisfy this property, i.e., the Banzhaf value is not efficient. In this paper we consider the normalized Banzhaf value which distributes the payoff that can be obtained by the `grand coalition' proportional to the Banzhaf values of the players. This value does not satisfy certain axioms underlying the Banzhaf value. In this paper we introduce some new axioms that characterize the normalized Banzhaf value. We also provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value using similar axioms. Received: 10 April 1996 / Accepted: 2 June 1997     

Master Production Scheduling Under Rolling Planning Horizons with Fixed Order Intervals

Fixed interval scheduling is studied in the context of a rolling horizon framework that is developed by building on previous work in the master scheduling area. The rolling horizon framework includes a stationary scheduling model which uses the “time fencing’concept by partitioning the planning horizon into three sections. The lengths of these sections and the frequency at which the stationary problem is updated and resolved are discussed as parameters of the rolling horizon model. Two different interpretations of the freeze interval parameter are examined, enabling confirmation and clarification of results presented in an earlier study. Details are given for three methods of calculating safety stocks as a function of rolling horizon parameters, including a method which results in optimal safety stock levels. A comparison of the safety stock methods shows that the constant safety stock method can result in inventories that are significantly above optimal under certain conditions, whereas the constant service level method consistently yields nearly optimal results.     

Child sexual abuse and psychological impairment in victims: results of an online study initiated by victims

Sexual abuse of children has been a topic of scientific investigation for the past few decades. Research in this area, however, is rarely initiated, conceptualized, and conducted by victims themselves. Apart from possibly having painted a one-sided picture of sexual abuse, this presumed dominance of nonvictims might also have marginalized victims in a research area central to their lives. This study was conducted by a victims interest group as an effort to meet the need to add victims' perspectives to our current understanding of this topic. The online survey focused on investigating victims' psychosocial impairment, which was found to be extensive. Results indicated that an intact social support system facilitates better health, especially when offered early on.     

Distance graphs on R n with 1-norm

Suppose S is a subset of a metric space X with metric d. For each subset D⊆{d(x,y):x,y∈S,x≠y}, the distance graph G(S,D) is the graph with vertex set S and edge set E(S,D)={xy:x,y∈S,d(x,y)∈D}. The current paper studies distance graphs on the n-space R ₁ ⁿ with 1-norm. In particular, most attention is paid to the subset Z ₁ ⁿ of all lattice points of R ₁ ⁿ . The results obtained include the degrees of vertices, components, and chromatic numbers of these graphs. Dedicated to Professor Frank K. Hwang on the occasion of his 65th birthday. Supported in part by the National Science Council under grant NSC-94-2115-M-002-015. Taida Institue for Mathematical Sciences, National Taiwan University, Taipei 10617, Taiwan. National Center for Theoretical Sciences, Taipei Office.     

A Banzhaf share function for cooperative games in coalition structure

A cooperative game with transferable utility–or simply a TU-game– describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A value function for these games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of payoffs over the players. Well-known solutions for TU-games are the Shapley and the Banzhaf value. An alternative type of solution is the concept of share function, which assigns to every player in a TU-game its share in the worth of the grand coalition. In this paper we consider TU-games in which the players are organized into a coalition structure being a finite partition of the set of players. The Shapley value has been generalized by Owen to TU-games in coalition structure. We redefine this value function as a share function and show that this solution satisfies the multiplication property that the share of a player in some coalition is equal to the product of the Shapley share of the coalition in a game between the coalitions and the Shapley share of the player in a game between the players within the coalition. Analogously we introduce a Banzhaf coalition structure share function. Application of these share functions to simple majority games show some appealing properties.     

The linkage effects of raw material processing in economic development: A survey of modeling and other approaches

Processing of primary raw materials has become an important and widely recommended strategy for economic development. Yet, even as the councils of many LDCs call for primary commodity producers to gain greater participation in downstream activities, there remain doubts on fundamental questions:What comparative advantage and what disadvantages do processing activities have in the LDCs?What linkages do processing activities offer?What is the potential contribution of processing to economic goal attainment in the LDCs?In this article we survey the material on processing, particularly with respect to modeling direct and indirect linkages between processing and the LDC economies. The article examines the following topics: (1) the literature on processing in economic development; (2) modeling processing linkages; and (3) outstanding questions regarding processing linkages.We focus on quantifiable linkages between the processing industry and the rest of the economy. There is also the possibility of other linkages, such as the development of entrepreneurship and management talent and technology, that are more difficult to quantify. It is important to distinguish between micro linkages, which refer to the direct impact on supplier and user sectors, and macro linkages, which include indirect general economic effects transmitted through government revenue and expenditures, the money supply, and foreign exchange availabilities.