Re-positioning the supplier: an SME perspective

As manufactured products become more complex, their design and manufacturing demands more and more resource which is being increasingly shared between the supply/value chain members. Competition is being typified less by firm versus firm and more by supply chain versus supply chain. The final assemblers are simplifying their supply chain to reduce logistics complexity and provide best value to the final customer. To suppliers, particularly SMEs, this gives rise to both opportunities for increasing 'added value', as well as threats of being dropped from rationalized supplier bases. Historically, SMEs have been sandwiched between large customers and suppliers and have always reacted to their superior bargaining power. Now, if the SMEs want to survive and grow, they have to adopt a more proactive stance to re-position themselves in response to these supply chain trends. In this paper, we present a technique for re-positioning the supplier in terms of'physical value added' and competency/practice-based 'differentiation'. We use the proposed approach to see how one supplier has successfully changed his business and another has developed plans to change, in line with the trends in their industry structure.     

CAN'T BUY ME LOVE? A FIELD EXPERIMENT EXPLORING THE TRADE‐OFF BETWEEN INCOME AND CASTE‐STATUS IN AN INDIAN MATRIMONIAL MARKET

A large body of literature depicts that status‐based discrimination is pervasive, but is silent on how economic incentive interacts with such discrimination. This study addresses this question by designing a field experiment in a reputable arranged marriage market that is prone to strong caste‐status‐based discrimination. We place newspaper advertisements of potential grooms by systematically varying their caste and income and focus on responses of higher‐caste females to lower‐caste males. The substantive finding is that despite the evidence of discrimination, discriminatory behavior of higher‐status females decreases with an increase in the advertised monthly income of lower‐status males. (JEL C93, J12, J15)     

VOTING FOR INCOME‐IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER–RICHARD MODEL

This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income‐redistribution program that finances a lump‐sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax. The political‐equilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred, utility‐wise, by the median voter. Ironically, this voter, and many poorer voters, may support a redistribution policy that leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility. (JEL H2, E6, D72)     

WHO IS AFRAID OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE?

We explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents in a standard monetary economy with two types of agents where the stationary distribution of money holdings is nondegenerate. Sans type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; it may not maximize aggregate ex ante social welfare either. Indeed, one or, more surprisingly, both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. ( JEL E31, E51, E58)