LAWYERS IN VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Real‐world financial contracts are sometimes so complex that it can be difficult to understand their exact payoff consequences. We develop and test a theoretical model of a venture capitalist (VC) negotiating with an entrepreneur who may overweigh or underweigh the payoff consequences of contractual downside protection (DP). A lawyer with expertise in venture capital can inform the entrepreneur about these consequences, but less expert (but otherwise high quality) lawyers cannot. We determine how a VC's decision to include DP is affected by the expected quality of the entrepreneur's project, the entrepreneur's experience, and the VC expertise of his/her legal counsel. We show that the VC's incentive to include unnecessary DP declines in expected project quality. Indeed, for inexperienced entrepreneurs involved with high‐quality projects, VCs prefer that the entrepreneur's counsel has VC expertise. This implies that, when negotiating with inexperienced entrepreneurs, VCs who invest in high‐quality companies should be more likely to negotiate with entrepreneurs who employ lawyers with VC expertise. We document broad empirical support for the model, and provide evidence against competing explanations. (JEL L24, G24, K12, L14, L24)     

PRESERVATION OF TRADE SECRETS AND MULTINATIONAL WAGE PREMIA

This paper considers the strategic behavior of a multinational firm with superior technology operating in a developing country. Domestic firms do not have access to the superior technology other than by hiring away multinational corporation (MNC) workers. The MNC can retain its workers by paying a wage premia, and we determine how the industry structure and the nature of strategic competition between firms affects the MNC's incentive to pay this premia and thus preserve its informational advantage. We characterize conditions under which MNCs inefficiently divide job tasks in order to raise the cost to domestic firms of acquiring the MNC's trade secrets. ( JEL F23, J31, O33)     

UNIVERSITY COMPETITION,GRADING STANDARDS,AND GRADE INFLATION

We develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities. Universities choose grading standards to maximize the total wages of graduates, taking into account how the grading standards affect firms' productivity assessment and job placement. We identify conditions under which better universities set lower grading standards, exploiting the fact that firms cannot distinguish between “good” and “bad”“A’'s. In contrast, a social planner sets stricter standards at better universities. We show how increases in skilled jobs drive grade inflation, and determine when grading standards fall faster at better schools. (JEL I21)     

PAYOFF DOMINANCE VS. COGNITIVE TRANSPARENCY IN DECISION MAKING

This paper reports on three laboratory experiments designed to investigate the roles of decision costs and rewards on the accuracy of economic decisions. The experimental vehicle is a purchase decision employing the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (BDM) mechanism. The first experiment verifies the incentive-compatibility of the BDM in a pure induced-value setting; the second tests its performance under different information regimes and payoff schedules; the third addresses the role of feedback information. Steep payoff schedules are found to be necessary to optimizing behavior only in cases where subjects must search out an optimal strategy rather than being able to deduce it from information provided. (JEL C91, D83)     

POINT SHAVING IN COLLEGE BASKETBALL: A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR FORENSIC ECONOMICS

Point shaving is the practice by favored teams of attempting to win by less than the point spread to yield profits for gamblers who bet on the underdog. Consistent with point shaving, strong favorites are anomalously likely to win by less than the spread. To distinguish between innocent and criminal explanations, we (1) exploit information in line movements and (2) isolate games without betting lines to identify games where point shaving is implausible and document similar patterns. The data are better explained by strategic efforts to maximize the probability of winning. These findings highlight the importance of methodology design. ( JEL L83, K42)