Normes,théorie des jeux et pratiques participatives: le poids réel des travailleurs dans les économies libérales

Les auteurs analysent l'effet de la directive européenne relative à l'information et à la consultation des travailleurs sur les pratiques participatives en entreprise au Royaume‐Uni et en Irlande. Dans une analyse conceptuelle et empirique, qui fait appel à la théorie des jeux, ils formulent trois hypothèses explicatives, qu'ils cherchent à vérifier avec des données qualitatives recueillies auprès de seize entreprises. La démonstration permet de comprendre pourquoi la coopération, gage de gains mutuels, n'est pas la solution qui l'emporte dans les pays examinés, et elle nous en dit un peu plus sur l'effet des normes sur la gestion participative dans les économies de marché libérales.     

The Mixed Fortunes of Irish Unions: Living with the Paradoxes of Social Partnership

We assess the fortunes of Irish unions since 1980 and, in particular, focus on the period of national social partnership since 1987. We argue that, structurally, unions have been weakened by a sharp decline in union density levels. In addition, labor law reform has not been as permissive as unions desired. However, on the other hand, we highlight that union membership in Ireland has never been higher and unions exert a strong influence over many areas of government policy. In conclusion, we argue that continuing with social partnership is the most viable option for Irish unions, though significant gains in union power are unlikely to happen.     

Employment regulation,game theory and weak employee voice in liberal economies

This article analyses the impact of information and consultation regulations – specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive – on worker participation or “employee voice” in liberal market economies (LMEs), providing both empirical and theoretical insights to complement existing research on the Directive. Using game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework, and empirical data from 16 case studies, the authors explain why national legislation implementing the Directive is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual‐gains cooperation in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Three theoretical explanatory propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of information and consultation regulations in LMEs.