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Jan-Willem Van Der Rijt 《Theory and Decision》2008,64(1):81-101
Most models of the formation of political coalitions use either Euclidean spaces or rely purely on game theory. This limits
their applicability. In this article, a single model is presented which is more broadly applicable. In principle any kind
of set can be used as a policy space. The model is also able to incorporate different kinds of party motivations: both rent-seeking
and idealism. The model uses party preferences and power to identify stable coalitions and predict government policy as well
as to indicate which member of the opposition will be able to break up the governing coalition if no stable coalition exists.
In the latter case it will also indicate on which issue the government is likely to split. Parties may have preferences over
issues such as the composition of cabinet and/or the governing coalition as well as the more traditional issues of government
formation. The model also provides a rationale for log-rolling. 相似文献
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A new model of coalition formation 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Agnieszka Rusinowska Harrie de Swart Jan-Willem van der Rijt 《Social Choice and Welfare》2005,24(1):129-154
In this paper, a new model of multidimensional coalition formation in politics is presented. The model provides an opportunity to analyze a number of different kinds of issues at the same time. A policy space consists of a finite number of independent sub-spaces (policy spaces on certain issues), which can be multidimensional. Any policy sub-space on a certain sub-issue can be either a Euclidean space or (in principle) any other type of set. So, it is possible to include issues which cannot be represented by a Euclidean space or a fixed sum. A government is defined as a pair consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. The majority coalition may be not minimal winning. Each party is allowed to give one qualification to a policy on a certain issue and to a majority coalition: desirable of a certain degree, acceptable, or unacceptable. By representing party preferences the way we do, we can include both rent-seeking and idealistic motivations in one consistent model. We define the value of a policy/coalition/government to a party, and the notions of a feasible and stable policy/coalition/government. The model uses party preferences in order to predict government policy. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a stable government are investigated. Moreover, some alternative definitions of a stable government are introduced, and relations between these definitions and the chosen definition of a stable government are established.For Agnieszka Rusinowska the research for this paper was done during a stay as a Marie Curie fellow at Tilburg University, Department of Philosophy. 相似文献
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We represent consensus formation processes based on iterated opinion pooling (DeGroot in J Am Stat Assoc 69:118–121, 1974; Lehrer and Wagner in Rational consensus in science and society: a philosophical and mathematical study. Springer, Berlin, 1981) as a dynamic approach to common knowledge of posteriors (Aumann in Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis in J Econ Theory 28:192–200, 1982). We thus provide a concrete and plausible Bayesian rationalization of consensus through iterated pooling. The link clarifies the conditions under which iterated pooling can be rationalized from a Bayesian perspective, and offers an understanding of iterated pooling in terms of higher-order beliefs. 相似文献
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Ibsen Bjarne Elmose-Østerlund Karsten Feiler Svenja Breuer Christoph Seippel Ørnulf Van der Roest Jan-Willem Scheerder Jeroen 《Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations》2019,30(5):1148-1163
VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations - Non-profit associations are usually democratically organized, and this feature plays a legitimizing role for the public... 相似文献
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