Impatience versus Incentives

This paper studies the dynamics of long‐term contracts in repeated principal–agent relationships with an impatient agent. Despite the absence of exogenous uncertainty, Pareto‐optimal dynamic contracts generically oscillate between favoring the principal and favoring the agent.     

Social evolution: Learning theory applied to group action

This article aims at showing that an individualistic explanation of societal evolution is possible as well as fruitful. In order to accomplish that an individualistic theory (value expectancy or utility theory) is applied to explain the development of an utopian group. Conditions are specified under which this system develops in different ways. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the application of individualistic theories results in the modification of some existing hypotheses, for example, from marxist writings. The paper also explores the logic and possibilities of constructing evolutionary hypotheses.This paper has been translated from German by Claus Frank, with help from Claudia Wawrzinek. I am grateful to Claus Frank for some valuable criticism, especially concerning the formalization in note 3.     

Norms and rationality. Is moral behavior a form of rational action?

This article addresses major arguments in the controversy about the “rationality” of moral behavior: can moral behavior be explained by rational choice theory (RCT)? The two positions discussed are the incentives thesis (norms are incentives as any other costs and benefits) and the autonomy thesis claiming that moral behavior has nothing to do with utility. The article analyses arguments for the autonomy thesis by J. Elster, A. Etzioni, and J. G. March and J. P. Olsen. Finally, the general claim is discussed whether norm following and norm emergence are utility maximizing. The conclusion is that the autonomy thesis is not tenable if one applies a wide subjectivist, social psychological version of RCT that includes the assumption of “bounded rationality.” The autonomy thesis is only compatible with a narrow version of RCT that excludes internal outcomes and that refers to norms that do not have external outcomes. It is argued that such a narrow version is not capable of explaining many forms of behavior social scientists are interested in.     

Dissecting the Conditions of Political Protest. An Exploration of Interaction Effects in the Explanation of Political Protest

This study addresses the conditions for the participation in protest activities. Starting from social psychological value expectancy theory and the theory of collective action, we study the effects of political discontent, perceived political influence (efficacy), norms to participate, identity, and membership in protest encouraging networks (“social incentives”) on protest. This study challenges the common assumption that these factors have additive effects only and provides a detailed analysis of interaction effects. Another contribution is the theoretical derivation of interaction effects. Our empirical analyses refer to the protests in Leipzig (East Germany) in 1989 under communist rule. Two‐way interactions are found between the following pairs of variables: discontent, influence, and norms. “Identity” (i.e., identification with West Germany) only interacts with discontent. Furthermore, identification is a surrogate for discontent: If identification is strong, discontent no longer influences protest. If identification is weak, increasing discontent raises protest.     

Das Aggregationsproblem bei Mikro-Makro-Erklärungen

The present paper discusses a component of the micro-macro explanatory model (i.e. the individualistic research program): the question is whether and, if so, how collective properties (or, equivalently, macro variables) can be constructed by properties of individuals (i.e. by aggregating micro variables). This is the aggregation problem. After sketching the procedure of micro-macro explanations and its possible problems the state of research in regard to the aggregation problem is described. Then two kinds of aggregation are analyzed in detail: analytical aggregations (i.e. the micro-to-macro relationship is a logical one) and empirical aggregations (i.e. the micro-to-macro relationship is empirical). It is further discussed whether there exist collective properties that cannot be reconstructed individualistically. Many collective properties emerge by the unintended consequences of individual action. It is argued that the structure of micro-macro explanations do not differ if these consequences are intended or unintended. In the final part it is claimed that there are emergent properties but that they do not invalidate methodological individualism. In this context it is argued that “ontological” arguments are not helpful for solving explanatory problems of the social sciences.