Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of hidden information and hidden action problems in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers to former clients of a major South African lender along three dimensions: (i) an initial “offer interest rate” featured on a direct mail solicitation; (ii) a “contract interest rate” that was revealed only after a borrower agreed to the initial offer rate; and (ii) a dynamic repayment incentive that was also a surprise and extended preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remained in good standing. These three randomizations, combined with complete knowledge of the lender's information set, permit identification of specific types of private information problems. Our setup distinguishes hidden information effects from selection on the offer rate (via unobservable risk and anticipated effort), from hidden action effects (via moral hazard in effort) induced by actual contract terms. We find strong evidence of moral hazard and weaker evidence of hidden information problems. A rough estimate suggests that perhaps 13% to 21% of default is due to moral hazard. Asymmetric information thus may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high‐risk borrowers.     

Operational research at the National Defence Research Institute of Sweden (FOA)

This paper gives an account of an institute for applied research so as to enable comparisons to be made with other institutes: such comparisons need not be limited to defence establishments. In elaborating the methodology of the institute its local concepts are applied, a conceptualisation which has proven useful outside defence [I]. Defence methodology still creates civilian spin-off.     

Identifying the barriers and challenges to voting by residents in nursing homes and assisted living settings

To ascertain the need for and to inform development of guidelines for voting in long-term care settings, we conducted a telephone survey of Philadelphia nursing (n = 31) and assisted living (n = 20) settings following the 2003 election. Substantial variability existed in procedures used for registration and voting, in staff attitudes, and in the estimated proportion of residents who voted (29%+/-28, range 0-100%). Residents who wanted to vote were unable to do so at nearly one-third of sites, largely due to procedural problems. Nearly two-thirds of facilities indicated they assessed residents' voting capacity before the election. However, methods differed and may have disenfranchised residents who were actually competent to vote. Current procedures in many facilities fail to protect voting rights. These data suggest that rights might be better protected if election officials took charge of registration, filing absentee ballot requests, ballot completion, and trained LTC facility staff on voters' rights and reasonable accommodations.     

CANDY ELASTICITY: HALLOWEEN EXPERIMENTS ON PUBLIC POLITICAL STATEMENTS

We conducted experiments during trick‐or‐treating on Halloween in a predominantly liberal neighborhood in the weeks preceding the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. We decorated one side of a house porch with McCain material in 2008 (Romney material in 2012) and the other side with Obama material. Children were asked to choose a side, with half receiving the same candy on either side and half receiving more candy to go to the McCain/Romney side. This yields a “candy elasticity” of children's political support. Results vary by age: children ages nine and older were two to three times more likely to choose the Republican candidate when offered double candy for voting Republican compared to when offered equal candy, whereas children ages eight and under were particularly sticky and did not waver in their choice of candidate despite the offer of double candy. (JEL C93, D72, D12)     

The changing role of the European company

The European Company was originally perceived as a means of encouraging the concentration of companies within the EEC to form enterprises of ‘European’ dimensions. However, with recent changes in Community attitudes towards the desirability of concentration, the reluctance of national governments to allow freedom of movement in some important areas of industrial activity and a feeling of frustration in the Commission that progress in related areas of industrial policy is slow or non-existent, a significant change in emphasis in the role of the European Company can be detected.