全球治理机制的合法性

关于全球治理机制合法性的讨论常常充满着困惑,因为学界从未建立关于全球治理机制合法性适当的分类标准。本文认为,界定合法性概念对全球治理机制十分重要,合法性的评估不能简化为对自利的探讨,正义性与合法性应该区别对待。本文着重探讨全球治理机制合法化的充要条件,即所谓的复合标准。这种标准要求确保民主国家对问责渠道达成一致,包含三种独立的合法性评估标准(可接受的最低道德标准、相对获益和完整性),以及应对实际和规范不确定性的有效认知方法。机制与社会政治环境之间的关系是全球治理机制合法性的重要内容,其中监督和批评全球治理机制运作的外部代理人对机制持续的合法性非常重要。此外,尽管民主价值观念对合法性很重要,但这并不意味着国家层级的某些程序在全球层级也同样必需。     

The Emergence of Autoclitic Frames in Atypically and Typically Developing Children as a Function of Multiple Exemplar Instruction

In two experiments, we tested the effect of multiple exemplar instruction (MEI) for training sets on the emergence of autoclitic frames for spatial relations for novel tacts and mands. In Experiment 1, we used a replicated pre- and post-intervention probe design with four students with significant learning disabilities to test for acquisition of four autoclitic frames with novel tacts and mands before and after MEI. The untaught topographies emerged for all participants. In Experiment 2, we used a multiple probe design to test the effects of the MEI procedures on the same responses in four typically developing, bilingual students. The novel usage emerged for all participants. In the latter experiment, the children demonstrated untaught usage of mand or tact frames regardless of whether they were taught to respond in either listener or speaker functions alone or across listener and speaker functions. The findings are discussed in terms of the role of MEI in the formation of abstractions.     

The Ecology of Terror Defense

We draw on an ecological metaphor to analyze terror defense by governments and individuals. Governments can combat terror in part by targeting what we call the “stock of terror capacity” accumulated by a terrorist organization. The optimal control of terror stocks relies on both periodic cleanup and ongoing abatement, a lesson derived from the optimal control of other stocks of public bads, such as pollution. Citizens can protect themselves from terror by avoiding exposure to threats and by reducing the harm they suffer if an attack occurs—actions we call “avoidance” and “amelioration,” respectively. Such measures may exert positive or negative externalities on other individuals. A simple model shows how individual responses to collective threats may undermine the effectiveness of government policies to address such threats. The model uncovers a strong analogy between the problem of individual responses to terror and the familiar congestion externality.