Sexual orientation differences in HIV testing motivation among college men

Objective: To investigate sexual orientation differences in college men's motivations for HIV testing. Participants: 665 male college students in the Southeastern United States from 2006 to 2014. Methods: Students completed a survey on HIV risk factors and testing motivations. Logistic regressions were conducted to determine the differences between heterosexual men (HM) and sexual minority men (SMM). Results: SMM were more motivated to get tested by concern over past condomless sex, while HM were more often cited supporting the testing program “on principle” and wanting a free t-shirt. SMM and HM differed in behaviors that impact HIV risk and other demographics. However, differences in testing motivation by concern over past condomless sex or wanting a free t-shirt persisted when controlling for these demographic and behavioral differences. Conclusions: Appropriately designed HIV prevention interventions on college campuses should target SMM's distinct concern over past condomless sex as a testing motivation.     

The credit channel of monetary policy transmission: evidence from stock returns

This paper offers a novel test of the credit view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism using stock market returns. We identify Fed policy shocks using newspaper accounts and track daily stock prices immediately following the shocks. If the credit channel is important, then firms that are dependent on bank credit and internal funds should receive a relatively greater benefit (loss) from a Fed easing (tightening) than firms with access to nonbank credit at favorable terms. We identify ten policy shocks during the expansion of 1993-94 and the 'credit crunch' period of the 1990-91 recession and find little evidence supportive of an operative credit channel.     

Predictors of vaccination rates during a mass meningococcal vaccination program on a college campus

Factors contributing to students' compliance with mass vaccination programs during meningococcal outbreaks have not been well described. A 1997 mass vaccination campaign at Michigan State University provided an opportunity to study such factors. Of 34,024 students in the target population, 17,538 (51.5%) were vaccinated in 5 days. Vaccination rates were higher for women (47.9%) than for men (43.1%) and higher for on-campus residents (65.3%) than for off-campus residents (35.6%). For each year of students' age beyond 19, the adjusted odds of vaccination were reduced by 0.82. Adjusted odds ratios for vaccination, with White students as the reference group at 1.0, were 1.33 for Asian American students, 0.97 (not significant) for Hispanic students, 0.82 for African American students, and 0.80 for Native American students. Students from the Colleges of Business, Engineering, Communication, and Natural Science had the highest vaccination rates; those from the College of Arts and Letters had the lowest rates.     

When Should a Firm Open its Source Code: A Strategic Analysis

Deciding to open the source code of a software product has advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantage is that the firm loses the revenue from the software. The advantage is that the users' network can contribute to the quality of the software code, which increases the demand for the software and for a complementary product. Demand for the complementary product also goes up, because demand for a product increases when the price of its complement decreases, and under open source, the price of the software product drops down to zero. This paper examines the strategic interactions at work here, within a duopoly framework, and tries to determine the circumstances under which it is optimal for a firm to open its code. We find that firms open the source code when there is a competitive software‐product market, a less competitive complementary‐product market, and when the complementary product is of high quality. Furthermore, it is more profitable for the firm to open the source code if its competitor also does so. When this happens the incentive to open the code can even be higher than in a monopoly situation. More intense competition induces symmetric equilibria in which both firms choose the same strategy.