Academic economists behaving badly? A survey on three areas of unethical behavior

This article measures the degree to which academic economists have engaged in unethical behavior and the degree to which academic economists believe the profession as a whole engages in unethical behavior. Three main types of unethical behavior are examined: (1) falsification of research; (2) expropriation of graduate student research or including an undeserving co-author on a research paper; and (3) exchange of grades for gifts, money, or sex. Using a unique data set gathered at the 1998 American Economic Association (AEA) meetings, we find that there is a significant amount of misconduct, particularly in the second category.     

Attitudinal and normative predictors of alcohol use by older adolescents and young adults

A model of alcohol use based on the theory of planned behavior, expectancy theory, and the developmental literature on the influence of parents and peers was examined with 87 eleventh grade students, 105 college freshmen, and 107 college juniors. Specifically, the influence of attitudes about the positive and negative consequences of drinking, perceived parental and peer norms about alcohol consumption, and perceived control over drinking predicted self-reported alcohol use. The results suggest that, during adolescence, decisions to consume alcohol are rational, based on the consideration of the positive consequences of alcohol use and perceptions of control over drinking; however, the negative consequences of alcohol use are discounted. While perceived peer norms predicted alcohol consumption in all three age groups, the influence of perceived parental norms varied such that they predicted alcohol use only among the college juniors. Implications and avenues for future research are discussed.     

Team effects on compensation: an application to salary determination in the National Hockey League

Studies of salary determination largely model pay as a function of the attributes of the individual and the workplace (i.e., employer size, job characteristics, and so forth). This article empirically investigates an additional factor that may influence individual pay, specifically coworker productivity. Data from professional sports are used to evaluate this question because both salary and teammate performance measures are readily available. We find that team attributes have both direct effects on an individual's pay, and indirect effects through altering the rates at which individual player productive characteristics are valued.