Norms,status and the dynamics of advice networks: A case study

The issue of the influence of norms on behavior is as old as sociology itself. This paper explores the effect of normative homophily (i.e. “sharing the same normative choices”) on the evolution of the advice network among lay judges in a courthouse. 0020 and 0025 social exchange theory suggests that members select advisors based on the status of the advisor. Additional research shows that members of an organization use similarities with others in ascribed, achieved or inherited characteristics, as well as other kinds of ties, to mitigate the potentially negative effects of this strong status rule. We elaborate and test these theories using data on advisor choice in the Commercial Court of Paris. We use a jurisprudential case about unfair competition (material and “moral” damages), a case that we submitted to all the judges of this court, to test the effect of normative homophily on the selection of advisors, controlling for status effects. Normative homophily is measured by the extent to which two judges are equally “punitive” in awarding damages to plaintiffs. Statistical analyses combine longitudinal advice network data collected among the judges with their normative dispositions. Contrary to what could be expected from conventional sociological theories, we find no pure effect of normative homophily on the choice of advisors. In this case, therefore, sharing the same norms and values does not have, by itself, a mitigating effect and does not contribute to the evolution of the network. We argue that status effects, conformity and alignments on positions of opinion leaders in controversies still provide the best insights into the relationship between norms, structure and behavior.     

Position in formal structure, personal characteristics and choices of advisors in a law firm: A logistic regression model for dyadic network data

This paper presents a statistical model for the analysis of binary sociometric choice data, the p₂ model, which provides a flexible way for using explanatory variables to model network structure. It is applied to examine the influence of the formal structure of an organization on interactions among its members. It is shown to provide a general and precise method for addressing this substantive issue. We identify the respective effects of position in the formal structure (status, seniority, division of work and office membership) and selected personal characteristics of members of a corporate law firm on their choices of advisors. Flows of advice are shown to be consistently shaped by status games and the pecking order in the firm. Other dimensions help members in mitigating the effect of this strong rule. This approach ultimately provides more understanding of how members of such firms try to balance cooperation and competition in terms of access to and management of key resources.     

BRINGING PERSONALIZED TIES BACK IN: Their Added Value for Biotech Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists Interorganizational Networks

Using a unique data set collected in France among biotech entrepreneurs and their venture capital investors (VCs), we measure the added value of personal relationships at the interorganizational level. Our analyses show that when two entrepreneurs share a personal collaboration tie or a personal friendship tie with a VC investor, the probability of having an advice tie and thus exchange tacit knowledge increases significantly. We confirm the importance of this kind of social embeddedness in the biotech industry where personalized ties––as opposed to institutional and contractual relationships––at the interorganizational level had not yet been examined systematically. Our results suggest that strategies of personalization of exchanges are vital for interorganizational learning. These strategies help entrepreneurs to access resources, participate in knowledge building, and co‐orientate activities in this sector.     

Deux définitions de la collégialité et leur articulation: le cas d’un diocèse catholique

Against the background of the conflict observed between managers and professionals, two definitions of collegiality are identified: on the one hand, as a specific organizational form (bottom up) and, on the other, as a procedure of bureaucratic management (top down). A study of networks of priests in a catholic diocese in France is used to explore how these two definitions are related. Questions are raised about the effects of a too narrow organizational rationalization that uses collegiality only as a top down, bureaucratic managerial procedure. This always entails the risk of making the work done by experts sterile because it overlooks the first type of collegiality, which is based on the nature of the nonroutine tasks that members perform jointly thanks to an endogenous organizational structure of a bottom up type.     

Exponential random graph models for multilevel networks

Modern multilevel analysis, whereby outcomes of individuals within groups take into account group membership, has been accompanied by impressive theoretical development (e.g. Kozlowski and Klein, 2000) and sophisticated methodology (e.g. Snijders and Bosker, 2012). But typically the approach assumes that links between groups are non-existent, and interdependence among the individuals derives solely from common group membership. It is not plausible that such groups have no internal structure nor they have no links between each other. Networks provide a more complex representation of interdependence. Drawing on a small but crucial body of existing work, we present a general formulation of a multilevel network structure. We extend exponential random graph models (ERGMs) to multilevel networks, and investigate the properties of the proposed models using simulations which show that even very simple meso effects can create structure at one or both levels. We use an empirical example of a collaboration network about French cancer research elites and their affiliations (0125 and 0120) to demonstrate that a full understanding of the network structure requires the cross-level parameters. We see these as the first steps in a full elaboration for general multilevel network analysis using ERGMs.     

Performance et relations de conseil: comment la structure relationnelle de l’élite des chercheurs français en cancérologie a conditionné leur progression entre 1999–2001 et 1996–1998

This article shows that performances of a specific subpopulation of French researchers in cancer research depend on their advice network. They make progress if they maximize access to scarce resources and their connection to other groups in certain cases. The absence of status competition within the group of peers is an advantage as well as a sufficient relational opening beyond the group with a majority of “dependent” researchers. By taking into account a shape of “glass ceiling” and a specific case of hematologists, the researchers who have the right structural qualities are 11 times more likely to make progress in terms of performance.     

Catching up with big fish in the big pond? Multi-level network analysis through linked design

This article contributes to the study of “duality” [Breiger, R., 1974. The duality of persons and groups. Social Forces 53, 181–190] in social life. Our study explores multi-level networks of superposed and partially connected interdependencies, the first being inter-organizational, the second inter-individual. We propose a method of structural linked design as an articulation for these levels. First, we examine separately the complete networks at each level. Second, we combine the two networks in relation to one another using systematic information about the membership of each individual in the first network (inter-individual) to one of the organizations in the second network (inter-organizational), as in bipartite networks. This dual positioning, or the linked design approach, is carried out in an empirical study examining performance variations within the “elite” of French cancer researchers in 1999. By looking at measures of centrality, we identify the actors that these top researchers consider as central or peripheral at the inter-individual level (the big and the little fish among the elite), and the laboratories that the research directors consider as central or peripheral at the inter-organizational level (the big and the little ponds among all the laboratories conducting cancer research in France at that time). In addition to the rather trivial report of the competitive advantage of big fish in big ponds (particularly because of the advantage of size for laboratories in this field), we use measurements of scientific performance to identify “catching up” strategies that the smallest fish use in this system. We suggest that this method offers new insights into the duality and multi-level dimension of complex systems of interdependencies, and also into the ways in which actors manage these interdependencies. We believe that it adds a new dimension to the sociological exploration of the determinants of performance, of meso-level phenomena such as opportunity structures and institutional change, or of macro-level phenomena such as social inequalities.     

Two definitions of collegiality and their inter-relation: The case of a Roman Catholic diocese

Against the backdrop of the conflict observed between managers and professionals, two definitions of collegiality emerge: on one hand, a specific organizational form (bottom up) and, on the other, a procedure of bureaucratic management (top down). A study of networks of priests in a Roman Catholic diocese in France is used to explore how those two definitions are related. Questions are raised as to the effects of a too narrow organizational rationalization that uses collegiality only as a top down, bureaucratic, managerial procedure. This always entails the risk of making the work done by experts sterile because it overlooks the first type of collegiality, which is based on the nature of non-routine tasks that members perform together thanks to an endogenous organizational structure of a bottom up type.