A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics

Voter preferences are characterized by a parameter s (say, income) distributed on a set S according to a probability measure F. There is a single issue (say, a tax rate) whose level, b, is to be politically decided. There are two parties, each of which is a perfect agent of some constituency of voters, voters with a given value of s. An equilibrium of the electoral game is a pair of policies, b ₁ and b ₂, proposed by the two parties, such that b _i maximizes the expected utility of the voters whom party i represents, given the policy proposed by the opposition. Under reasonable assumptions, the unique electoral equilibrium consists in both parties proposing the favorite policy of the median voter. What theory can explain why, historically, we observe electoral equilibria where the ‘right’ and ‘left’ parties propose different policies? Uncertainty concerning the distribution of voters is introduced. Let {F(t)} _{t ε T} be a class of probability measures on S; all voters and parties share a common prior that the distribution of t is described by a probability measure H on T. If H has finite support, there is in general no electoral equilibrium. However, if H is continuous, then electoral equilibrium generally exists, and in equilibrium the parties propose different policies. Convergence of equilibrium to median voter politics is proved as uncertainty about the distribution of voter traits becomes small.     

Political–economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case

 A political–economic environment is studied in which two parties, representing different constituencies of citizens, compete over a proportional tax rate to be levied on private endowments, to finance a public good. Although parties know the distribution of citizen traits (preferences and endowments), they are uncertain about the distribution of traits among the citizens who will turn up at the polls. This uncertainty engenders an endogenously derived function π(t ₁, t ₂) giving the probability that any one tax policy t ₁ will defeat another t ₂ in the election. Equilibrium existence theorems are proved, and the nature of equilibrium is compared with the equilibrium that exists when Downsian parties (ones whose objective is to maximize the probability of victory) face uncertainty. Both constituency-representing parties and uncertainty are needed to generate equilibria in which parties propose different policies. Received: 4 April 1995/Accepted: 2 April 1996     

Alcohol abuse as a rite of passage: the effect of beliefs about alcohol and the college experience on undergraduates' drinking behaviors

Qualitative studies of alcohol's ritual influences indicate that college undergraduates who drink heavily tend to view alcohol use as integral to the student role and feel entitled to drink irresponsibly. Our analyses, based on a standardized measure of these beliefs administered to approximately 300 students, confirmed these findings. Among our sample, beliefs about alcohol and the college experience had an effect on levels of alcohol consumption similar in magnitude to that of other variables commonly associated with a risk for heavy drinking. Moreover, the alcohol beliefs index moderated the effects of three risk factors--gender, high school drinking, and friends' use of alcohol--on respondents' drinking behaviors. These findings are discussed within the context of the anthropological literature on liminality and rites of passage and with regard to strategies for intervention that address the structural roots of the widespread abuse of alcohol on college campuses.     

A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters

We construct an equilibrium model of party competition, in which parties are especially concerned with their core and swing voters, concerns which political scientists have focused upon in their attempts to understand party behavior in general elections. Parties compete on an inifinite-dimensional space of possible income-tax policies. A policy is a function that maps pre-fisc income into post-fisc income. Only a fraction of each voter type will vote for each party, perhaps because of issues not modeled here or voter misperceptions of policies. Each party??s policy makers comprise two factions, one concerned with maximizing the welfare of its constituency, or its core, and the other with winning over swing voters. An equilibrium is a pair of parties (endogenously determined), and a pair of policies, one for each party, in which no deviation to another policy will be assented to both its core and swing factions. We characterize the equilibria: they have the property that both parties propose identical treatment of a possibly large interval of middle-income voters, while the ??left?? party gives more to the poor and the ??right?? party more to the rich. An empirical section uses the data of Piketty and Saez on taxation in the US to assess the model??s predictions. We argue that the model is roughly confirmed.     

Social choice in economic environments with dimensional variation

An argument for welfarist social evaluation is presented that replaces the independence axiom with a consistency axiom for social-evaluation functionals in economic environments. This axiom (consistency across dimension or COAD) requires that, if two allocations contain suballocations in common, and if individual utility functions are projected down to the smaller economy where allocations change, then these small allocations must be ranked in the same way that their ancestral allocations were.The basic result is applied to different information environments and a variety of ethical axioms appropriate to economic environments is investigated.We are indebted to Charles Blackorby, Erwin Diewert, Ed Morey, Bill Schworm and John Weymark for helpful discussions, and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Killiam Foundation and the National Science Foundation, for research support.     

The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation

Why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition? Analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two-dimensionality of the issue space. To give parties a choice over a domain that contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two-dimensional. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two-party game, whose players have complete preferences over a two-dimensional policy space, generically fails to exist. I introduce a new equilibrium concept for political games, based on the fact of factional conflict within parties. Each party is supposed to consist of reformists, militants, and opportunists: each faction has a complete preference order on policy space, but together they can only agree on a partial order. Nash equilibria of the two-party game, where the policy space consists of all quadratic income tax functions, and each party is represented by its partial order, exist, and it is shown that, in such equilibria, both parties propose progressive income taxation.     

Predictors of well-being in the lives of student service members and veterans

Objective: The current study examined predictors of well-being, including quality of life and academic engagement, in a sample of student service members and veteran college students. Methods: Eighty-seven student service members/veterans (SSM/V) completed an online survey containing questions about post-deployment social support, emotion regulation skills, psychological distress, academic engagement, quality of life, and demographics. Participants were recruited from September 2012 through May 2014. Results: Results provided partial support for the proposed bi-directional mediational relations between post-deployment social support and emotion regulation predicting to quality of life and academic engagement. Path models indicated that both post-deployment social support and emotion regulation skills partially mediated the relation with quality of life while accounting for the effect of psychological distress, and that emotion regulation skills fully mediated the relation between social support and academic engagement. Conclusions: These findings suggest that both social support and emotion regulation skills may be useful targets for health promotion and intervention efforts for this population. Limitations and clinical implications for the development of on-campus SSM/V focused health promotion services are discussed.