ARGUMENTATIVE COMPLEXITY OF ABORTION DISCOURSE

Using integrative complexity theory and its associated codingscheme, this article explores the structure of arguments onabortion articulated by single- and multi-issue "prochoice"and "pro-life" groups between July 1989 (following the SupremeCourt Webster v. Reproductive Health Services opinion) and May1991. A simple random sample of 13 paragraphsized statementsrepresentative of each organization's position was rated bytwo trained coders on a 7-point scale measuring conceptual differentiationand integration. The debate, as a whole, was conducted at alow level of integrative complexity. Contrary to the "rigidityof the Right" hypothesis, both prochoice and pro-life argumentswere characterized by similarly low levels of integrative complexity.Supporting an ideologue hypothesis, the arguments of multi-as opposed to single-issue organizations were more integrativelycomplex.     

THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF CONCESSION

We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of time preference, the potential loser can always avoid wasteful conflict through a time-consistent series of small concessions. We examine how the failure of each of these assumptions may explain why conflicts arise. We also debate which actions may be helpful in such unfortunate circumstances.     

DIRECT THREAT AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE TOLERANCE OF BLACKS TOWARD RACISTS

Using the NORC General Social Surveys from 1972 to 1984, weconstruct a question wording experiment that tests whether questionsconcerning the rights of a threatening group affect a respondent'swillingness to extend the same rights to other unrelated groups.Our findings suggest that a threatening stimulus in fact reducesa respondent's tolerance toward unrelated groups to a considerabledegree, although the effect is smaller for more highly educatedrespondents. We conclude by discussing some potential explanationsfor this interaction effect.     

CENTRAL BANKING AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM

Due to their ties with elected leaders, central bankers may pursue policies that are not in society's best interests. Consequently, the relationship between the public and the central bank can be characterized as a principal-agent problem. An inflation and stabilization bias arise as a result of this agency problem and the magnitudes of these biases depend on the political environment. Various institutional proposals for eliminating these biases are examined, and we find that central bank independence and performance contracts work best. However, we argue that central bank independence is preferable for resolving the agency problem.     

Appalachian Women’s Use of Substance Abuse Treatment: Examining the Behavioral Model for Vulnerable Populations

The Gelberg–Andersen Behavioral Model for Vulnerable Populations was applied to understand vulnerable Appalachian women’s (N = 400) utilization of addiction treatment. A secondary data analysis included multiple multivariate analyses. The strongest correlates of treatment utilization included ever injecting drugs (OR = 2.77), limited availability of substance abuse treatment facilities (OR = 2.03), and invalidated violence abuse claims (OR = 2.12). This study contributes theory-driven research to the greater social work addiction literature by confirming that vulnerable domains related to substance abuse treatment utilization warrant unique considerations compared to nonvulnerable domains. Findings also highlight the importance of understanding the unique role that cultural factors play in treatment utilization among Appalachian women. Inferences relevant to clinicians and policymakers are discussed.     

AN ANALYTIC HISTORY OF DELIVERED PRICE LITIGATION: DO COURTS PROPERLY DISTINGUISH RIVALROUS FROM COLLUSIVE INSTANCES?

The federal judiciary's present, cautious approach to delivered pricing is appropriate. Using court records and recent contributions to the economic literature, this article evaluates the antitrust history of those practices. Delivered pricing can replace mill pricing naturally in some rivalrous settings, but under special circumstances could be collusive. Thus, delivered pricing has sometimes been adjudged a Sherman Act violation, but only given other evidence of collusion. For a time, however, the legal system threatened to treat delivered pricing as a per se violation of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. That reflected poor economic understanding.