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In this account of the history of voting-power measurement, we confine ourselves to the concept of a priori voting power. We show how the concept was re-invented several times and how the circumstances in which it was reinvented led to conceptual confusion as to the true meaning of what is being measured. In particular, power-as-influence was conflated with value in the sense of transferable utility cooperative game theory (power as share in constant total payoff). Influence was treated, improperly, as though it were transferable utility, and hence an additive and distributive quantity. We provide examples of the resulting misunderstanding and mis-directed criticism. 相似文献
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This paper shows that a relatively easy algorithm for computing the (unique) outcome of a sophisticated voting procedure called sequential voting by veto (SVV) applies to a more general situation than considered hitherto. According to this procedure a sequence of n voters must select s out of m + s options (s > 0, m 3 n 3 2). The ith voter, when his turn comes, vetoes k
i options (k
i 1, k
i = m). The s remaining non-vetoed options are selected. Every voter is assumed to be fully informed of all other voters total (linear) preference orderings among the competing options, as well as of the order in which the veto votes are cast. This algorithm was proposed by Mueller (1978) for the special case where s and the k
i are all equal to 1, and extended by Moulin (1983) to the somewhat more general case where the k
i are arbitrary but s is still 1. Some theoretical and practical issues of voting by veto are discussed. 相似文献
3.
For any simple voting game (SVG), we consider the question posed in the title from two different points of view as to what
voting power means. We also distinguish between blocs imposed by annexation and those formed voluntarily, and present some
general theoretical results concerning these notions. We illustrate our theoretical findings with examples using both toy
SVGs and the Qualified Majority Voting rule of the Council of Ministers of the European Community (CMEC). We show that when
voting power is understood as influence (I-power), forming a voluntary bloc may be advantageous even if its voting power is
smaller than the sum of the original powers of its members; and it may be disadvantageous even if its voting power is greater
than that sum.
Received: 9 February 2000/Accepted: 19 October 2000 相似文献
4.
If K is an index of relative voting power for simple voting games, the bicameral postulate requires that the distribution of K -power within a voting assembly, as measured by the ratios of the powers of the voters, be independent of whether the assembly is viewed as a separate legislature or as one chamber of a bicameral system, provided that there are no voters common to both chambers. We argue that a reasonable index – if it is to be used as a tool for analysing abstract, uninhabited decision rules – should satisfy this postulate. We show that, among known indices, only the Banzhaf measure does so. Moreover, the Shapley–Shubik, Deegan–Packel and Johnston indices sometimes witness a reversal under these circumstances, with voter x less powerful than y when measured in the simple voting game G1 , but more powerful than y when G1 is bicamerally joined with a second chamber G2 . Thus these three indices violate a weaker, and correspondingly more compelling, form of the bicameral postulate. It is also shown that these indices are not always co-monotonic with the Banzhaf index and that as a result they infringe another intuitively plausible condition – the price monotonicity condition. We discuss implications of these findings, in light of recent work showing that only the Shapley–Shubik index, among known measures, satisfies another compelling principle known as the bloc postulate. We also propose a distinction between two separate aspects of voting power: power as share in a fixed purse (P-power) and power as influence (I-power). 相似文献
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The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting 总被引:14,自引:9,他引:5
We analyse and evaluate three decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU, which are prescribed by the `definitive
form' of the Treaty of Nice. The first will apply from 2005 to the present 15-member EU, if it will not have been enlarged
by then. The second or third will apply to an enlarged 27-member EU. We conclude that the first of these is an improvement
on the current decision rule; but the other two have extremely undesirable features.
Received: 23 February 2001/Accepted: 26 March 2001 相似文献
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This paper re-evaluates the problem of measuring thea priori relative voting power of a voter in an assembly. We propose several new intuitively compelling postualtes that any reasonable index of voting power ought to satisfy. At the same time we argue that most of the paradoxes of voting power discussed in the literature are paradoxical only in a weak sense, if at all. This leaves three crippling paradoxes — the well-known paradox ofweighted voting, and two new ones presented here: thebloc anddonation paradoxes. We evaluate the four main relative power indices discussed in the literature with respect to these three severe paradoxes. The Shapley-Shubik index is seen to be immune to all three paradoxes, while the Deegan-Packel index is vulnerable to all three. The Banzhaf and the Johnston indices are demonstrably immune to the paradox of weighted voting. However, they are shown to suffer from both the bloc and the donation paradoxes. We argue that this seriously undermines these indices in a hitherto unsuspected way. Several other theoretical issues relating to voting power are discussed. 相似文献
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