CAN THE PRESIDENT REALLY AFFECT ECONOMIC GROWTH? PRESIDENTIAL EFFORT AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

Presidential elections are often seen as referendums on the health of the economy; however, little evidence exists on the president's ability to influence gross domestic product (GDP). This study examines the effect of the incentive to be reelected and the resulting increase in presidential effort on GDP growth. Growth is found to rise in reelection years for first‐term presidents after 1932 and to fall in election years before 1932, when reelection was uncommon, and for second‐term presidents generally. This effect is largest for high‐quality presidents—who probably have the highest return to effort—and is spread across multiple sectors of the economy. (JEL D78, D72, E32, J24)     

Challenges to professionalism and union voting intentions: The case of pharmacists

Using data from a national survey of pharmacists who are members of the American Pharmaceutical Association, we examine the union voting intentions of employee pharmacists. We find that union instrumentality regarding professionalism is a primary predictor of union voting intent among these employees. In addition, this predictor mediates the relationship between the level of professionalism at a pharmacist’s current employment situation and his or her expected union vote. Also important to union voting intent are respondent beliefs about union instrumentality regarding pecuniary issues, prior union experience, as well as overall job satisfaction. Implications for employers, unions, and researchers are drawn. We thank Mary Graham, Jann Skelton, Paul Swiercz, Terry Thomason, and participants at the Seventh Bar-gaining Group Conference at Michigan State University for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. This research was made possible by a grant from the American Pharmaceutical Association.     

Factors associated with abuse in residential child care institutions

Confidence in the public care system in the United Kingdom (UK) has been shaken by numerous and widespread scandals surrounding the abuse of children and young people, particularly those in residential child care institutions. This paper examines factors associated with such abuse, including: failings in relation to staff recruitment, training, and supervision; ineffective management and systems of accountability; the development of inappropriate institutional cultures; public ambivalence towards children in care; the slow footed response to the threat posed to children and young people by dangerous men and other youngsters in care; and the long‐term policy failure to develop coherent and integrated systems of child welfare in the UK. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rehabilitating the Criminality of Immigrants Under Section 19 of the Canadian Immigration Act1

Immigration has historically been associated with moral entrepreneurship and xenophobia. In periods of high unemployment and global dislocation, immigrants easily become the targets of political commentators who complain of their criminality, morals, demand on public services, and competition for scarce employment. In this exercise, looking at the recidivism of immigrants who come to Canada with a previous, foreign criminal history, quite a different picture emerges. Among this random sample (N=204), 97.5 percent of immigrants granted a rehabilitation waiver under the provisions of the Canadian Immigration Act were not re‐arrested in Canada within a period of about 3.5 years after their landing was approved by the Minister. Of those who were arrested, most of the delinquency was manageable and, in fact, resulted in either an acquittal, diversion or lower‐range sanctions. This is not the kind of imagery complained of by the tabloids or critics in the body politic. It behooves us, then, to exercise care in discussing crime and immigration, as it is a subject easily prone to the creation of “moral panics” and resulting repressive legislation against persons of color.     

Population constraints on pooled surveys in demographic hazard modeling

In non-experimental research, data on the same population process may be collected simultaneously by more than one instrument. For example, in the present application, two sample surveys and a population birth registration system all collect observations on first births by age and year, while the two surveys additionally collect information on women’s education. To make maximum use of the three data sources, the survey data are pooled and the population data introduced as constraints in a logistic regression equation. Reductions in standard errors about the age and birth-cohort parameters of the regression equation in the order of three-quarters are obtained by introducing the population data as constraints. A halving of the standard errors about the education parameters is achieved by pooling observations from the larger survey dataset with those from the smaller survey. The percentage reduction in the standard errors through imposing population constraints is independent of the total survey sample size.