Human and organizational factors in offshore safety

The role of human and organizational factors in predicting accidents and incidents has become of major interest to the UK offshore oil and gas industry. Some of these factors had been measured in an earlier study focusing on the role of risk perception in determining accident involvement. The current study sought to extend the methodology by focusing on perceptions of organizational factors that could have an impact on safety. A self-report questionnaire was developed and distributed to 11 installations operating on the UK Continental Shelf. A total of 722 were returned (33% response rate) from a representative sample of the offshore workforce on these installations. The study investigated the underlying structure and content of offshore employees' attitudes to safety, feelings of safety and satisfaction with safety measures. Correlations and step-wise regression analysis were used to test the relationships between measures. The results suggest that 'unsafe' behaviour is the 'best' predictor of accidents/near misses as measured by self-report data and that unsafe behaviour is, in turn, driven by perceptions of pressure for production.     

Measuring safety climate on offshore installations

The human and organizational factors affecting safety were examined on 10 offshore installations using the Offshore Safety Questionnaire. The questionnaire contained scales measuring work pressure and work clarity, job communication, safety behaviour, risk perception, satisfaction with safety measures and safety attitudes. A total of 722 UK offshore workers (33% response rate) from a range of occupations completed and returned the questionnaire. The 'safety climates' on the various installations were characterized by most respondents feeling 'safe' with respect to a range of offshore hazards and expressing 'satisfaction' with safety measures. Respondents reported little risk-taking behaviour and felt positive about levels of work clarity and job communication. There was a wider diversity of opinions on the safety attitudes scale, indicating a lack of a positive, concerted 'safety culture' and more evidence for a range offragmented 'safety subcultures', which varied mainly as a function of seniority, occupation, age, shift worked and prior accident involvement. It is suggested that the interaction between these differing subcultures partly determines the prevailing 'safety climate' on any given installation. The UK oil and gas industry is now trying to improve its safety culture through the 'Stepchange' initiative, which hias set itself three main targets for the year 2000 : a 50 YO improvement in the industry's safety performance; safety performance contracts demonstrating leadership's personal concern for safety as an equal to business performance and encouraging industry members to work together to improve sharing of safety information and good practice. It is suggested that the existence of a strong, cohesive culture with respect to safety is not necessarily beneficial, possibly leading to 'dry rot' and complacency. A healthy culture may be represented by a range of assumptions, values, norms and expectations as reflected in employees' differing experiences of safety climate.     

Risk Perceptions of Offshore Workers on UK Oil and Gas Platforms

Knowledge of the workforce's risk perceptions and attitudes to safety is necessary for the development of a safety culture, where each person accepts responsibility for working safely. The ACSNI Human Factors report stresses the importance of assessing workforce perceptions of risk to achieve a proper safety culture. Risk perception research has been criticized for insufficient analysis of the causal relationships between risk factors and perceived risk. The present study reports some of the factors which predicted risk perception in a sample of 622 employees from six UKCS offshore oil installations who completed a 15-section questionnaire. This paper focuses on the accuracy of workers' risk perceptions and what underlying factors predict the perception of personal risk from both major and minor hazards.     

Benchmarking Safety Climate in Hazardous Environments: A Longitudinal, Interorganizational Approach

Safety climate is an important element of organizational reliability. This study applied benchmarking strategies for monitoring safety climate across nine North Sea oil and gas installations that were surveyed in consecutive years. Examination of absolute changes in safety climate complemented the benchmarking approach. Discriminant function analyses (DFA) identified the elements of safety climate predictive of self-reported accidents; correlational analyses were applied to the scale scores and accident proportions across the year period. Absolute improvements were substantial, with safety climate profiles converging in the second year. Large relative improvements were also observed. DFA highlighted perceived management commitment to safety and willingness to report accidents as significant predictors of personal accident involvement. Changes in perceived management commitment to safety were closely associated with changes in safety behavior.     

Explicit and Implicit Trust Within Safety Culture

Safety culture is an important topic for managers in high-hazard industries because a deficient safety culture has been linked to organizational accidents. Many researchers have argued that trust plays a central role in models of safety culture but trust has rarely been measured in safety culture/climate studies. This article used explicit (direct) and implicit (indirect) measures to assess trust at a UK gas plant. Explicit measures assessed trust by asking workers to consider and state their attitude to attitude objects. Implicit measures assessed trust in a more subtle way by using a priming task that relies on automatic attitude activation. The results show that workers expressed explicit trust for their workmates, supervisors, and senior managers, but only expressed implicit trust for their workmates. The article proposes a model that conceptualizes explicit trust as part of the surface levels of safety culture and implicit trust as part of the deeper levels of safety culture. An unintended finding was the positive relationship between implicit measures of trust and distrust, which suggests that trust and distrust are separate constructs. The article concludes by considering the implications for safety culture and trust and distrust in high-hazard industries.     

Human and organizational factors in offshore safety

The role of human and organizational factors in predicting accidents and incidents has become of major interest to the UK offshore oil and gas industry. Some of these factors had been measured in an earlier study focusing on the role of risk perception in determining accident involvement. The current study sought to extend the methodology by focusing on perceptions of organizational factors that could have an impact on safety. A self-report questionnaire was developed and distributed to 11 installations operating on the UK Continental Shelf. A total of 722 were returned (33% response rate) from a representative sample of the offshore workforce on these installations. The study investigated the underlying structure and content of offshore employees' attitudes to safety, feelings of safety and satisfaction with safety measures. Correlations and step-wise regression analysis were used to test the relationships between measures. The results suggest that 'unsafe' behaviour is the 'best' predictor of accidents/near misses as measured by self-report data and that unsafe behaviour is, in turn, driven by perceptions of pressure for production.