How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?

We estimate the frequencies with which ten voting anomalies (ties and nine voting paradoxes) occur under 14 voting rules, using a statistical model that simulates voting situations that follow the same distribution as voting situations in actual elections. Thus the frequencies that we estimate from our simulated data are likely to be very close to the frequencies that would be observed in actual three-candidate elections. We find that two Condorcet-consistent voting rules do, the Black rule and the Nanson rule, encounter most paradoxes and ties less frequently than the other rules do, especially in elections with few voters. The Bucklin rule, the Plurality rule, and the Anti-plurality rule tend to perform worse than the other eleven rules, especially when the number of voters becomes large.     

Research initiation based on idea-circles: from research object to co-actor

This article details an evaluation of a research project based on participatory research methods organized by the Swedish Disability Federation from 2008 to 2011. In Sweden there has been a lack of productive dialogue with the traditional academic world and the question was raised whether proposals for future research would be different if disabled people formulated them. Nine idea-circles with disabled participants and invited researchers from fields of interest close to the participants produced ideas, developed out of the life experience of being a disabled person. These ideas were developed into 72 research drafts that often reflected key advocacy areas, rather than operationalized research issues. The adjustment from the familiar discourse of political struggle to discussion of research was a complicated process for many. When asked to prioritize among areas for research, the representatives from the disability movement chose areas that are not stressed in mainstream disability research in Sweden.     

Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule

The ranked pairs voting rule introduced in Tideman [2] is independent of clones (not materially affected by the replication of a candidate) in all but a small domain of cases. Appending a particular tie-breaking rule to the ranked pairs rule generates a rule that is completely independent of clones.     

REVELATION MECHANISMS AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY

We show that revelation mechanisms affect owners' valuations of the assets they own and that different mechanisms provide owners with the incentive to reveal—truthfully—different valuations. Self‐assessment of property with compulsory sale at the self‐assessed price is the only known mechanism that promotes allocative efficiency by providing efficient incentives for transferring property to those who value it most. We introduce two modifications of the standard self‐assessment mechanism that maintain full incentives to invest and raise as much public revenue as can be raised efficiently. (JEL D61, D82, H21, K11)     

Structurally consistent probabilities of selecting answers

This paper offers a procedure for specifying probabilities for students to select answers on a multiple-choice test that, unlike previous procedures, satisfies all three of the following structural consistency conditions: (1) for any student, the sum over questions of the probabilities that the student will use the correct answers is the student's score on the test; (2) for any student, the sum over possible answers of the probabilities of using the answers is 1.0; and (3) for any answer to any question, the sum over students of the probabilities of using that answer is the number of students who used that answer. When applied to an exam, these fully consistent probabilities had the same power to identify cheaters as the probabilities proposed by Wesolowsky, and noticeably better power than the probabilities suggested by Frary et al.     

Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting

In social choice theory there has been, and for some authors there still is, a confusion between Arrow'sIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and somechoice consistency conditions. In this paper we analyze this confusion. It is often thought that Arrow himself was confused, but we show that this is not so. What happened was that Arrow had in mind a condition we callregularity, which implies IIA, but which he could not state formally in his model because his model was not rich enough to permit certain distinctions that would have been necessary. It is the combination of regularity and IIA that he discusses, and the origin of the confusion lies in the fact that if one uses a model that does not permit a distinction between regularity and IIA, regularity looks like a consistency condition, which it is not. We also show that the famous example that proves that Arrow was confused does not prove this at all if it is correctly interpreted.     

A majority-rule characterization with multiple extensions

When May's necessary and sufficient conditions for majority rule as a binary voting rule are extended in a natural way to decisions over more than two options, the resulting conditions are consistent with the Borda and Black voting rules, but not with a variety of other voting rules for more than two options. This paper presents an alternative set of necessary and sufficient conditions for binary majority rule, which permits the plurality, Condorcet and (simplified) Dodgson rules, as well as the Borda and Black rules, but not the Copeland or Nanson rules, to be classified as extensions of binary majority rule to decisions over more than two options.I am indebted to Amartya Sen and anonymous referees for helpful suggestions     

Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules

Independence of clones is a generalization of the condition of not being subject to the perverse consequences of vote splitting that arise under plurality voting. A new voting rule that is at least almost always independent of clones is obtained by the following algorithm: Require the collective ranking of the candidates to be consistent with the paired comparisons decided by the largest and second largest margins, and then, if possible, with the paired comparison decided by the third largest margin, and so on. The advantages of this ranked pairs rule over previously proposed voting rules that are independent of clones is that it possesses Condorcet consistency, non-negative responsiveness, and resolvability (the property that every tie be within one vote of being broken).I am indebted to Jaques Crémer, Amoz Kats, Martin Ricketts, Thomas Schwartz and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions.     

Long-term planning and forecasting in Europe

In January 1968, in the light of the Consultative Assembly's recommendations (Recommendation 516) aimed at giving the Work Programme a forward-looking dimension, the Secretary General invited a group of personalities of world-wide reputation to discuss the role they thought the Council of Europe might play in the field of long-term planning and forecasting. Following this meeting, which was attended, among others, by MM. Pietro Ferraro, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Robert Jungk, Johan Galtung and Professor Karl Steinbuch, a number of proposals were formulated with a view to intensifying co-operation between member countries in the field of future research at both governmental and non-governmental level. Such co-operation was intended, inter alia, to lay a scientific foundation for work concerned with the future which might find a place in the activities of the Council of Europe. The first step in this direction would be to compile an inventory of European bodies engaged in long-term planning and forecasting studies and of their activities (research, seminars, publications, etc.).