Social structure and homicide in post-Soviet Russia

The Russian homicide rate is among the highest in the world. Local rates are not uniform, however, but instead show tremendous variation throughout this large nation. As a result of varying levels of development, differential access to natural resources, past Soviet economic and social policies, and the varying pace of the social, political, and economic transition, there are also large differences across Russia in structural factors thought to be related to interpersonal violence. In this study, newly available vital statistics and socioeconomic data were employed to estimate the effects of social structural characteristics on homicide rates in the Russian regions (n = 78). Results revealed that commonly tested covariates such as poverty and single-parent households were positively associated with regional homicide victimization rates, as was a proxy for heavy drinking. Further, homicide rates in the Northern Caucasus and the regions east of the Ural mountains are significantly lower and higher, respectively, than in the rest of the country. These results are discussed in terms of the current Russian situation and integrated into the broader literature on social structure and homicide.     

SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE AND HOMICIDE IN A TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY

Durkheim argued that rapid social change would produce anomic conditions which, in turn, would lead to increases in criminal and deviant behavior. Russia provides a unique opportunity to test this theory given the large-scale fundamental socioeconomic changes occurring in the nation. Russian homicide rates more than doubled in the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and are now among the highest in the world. The pace and effects of the socioeconomic transition vary widely throughout Russia, however, as do rates of and changes in violent crime. In this study, we took advantage of the unique natural experiment of the collapse of the Soviet Union to examine the association between socioeconomic change and homicide. We measured the negative effects of socioeconomic change by creating an index of changes in population size, unemployment, privatization, and foreign investment. Using data from Russian regions (n = 78) and controlling for other structural covariates, regression results indicated that regions that more strongly experienced the negative effects of socioeconomic change were regions where homicide rates increased the most between 1991 and 2000. Further analysis of the individual components of this index revealed that regions with greater increases in (1) unemployment experienced greater increases in homicide rates and (2) privatization experienced smaller increases in homicide rates.     

Community organization moderates the effect of alcohol outlet density on violence

There is growing evidence from multiple disciplines that alcohol outlet density is associated with community levels of assault. Based on the theoretical and empirical literatures on social organization and crime, we tested the hypothesis that the association between alcohol outlet density and neighbourhood violence rates is moderated by social organization. Using geocoded police data on assaults, geocoded data on the location of alcohol outlets, and controlling for several structural factors thought to be associated with violence rates, we tested this hypothesis employing negative binomial regression with our sample of 298 block groups in Cincinnati. Our results revealed direct effects of alcohol outlet density and social organization on assault density, and these effects held for different outlet types (i.e., off‐premise, bars, restaurants) and levels of harm (i.e., simple and aggravated assaults). More importantly, we found that the strength of the outlet‐assault association was significantly weaker in more socially organized communities. Subsequent analyses by level of organization revealed no effects of alcohol outlet density on aggravated assaults in organized block groups, but significant effects in disorganized block groups. We found no association between social (dis)organization and outlet density. These results clarify the community‐level relationship between alcohol outlets and violence and have important implications for municipal‐level alcohol policies.     

A reassessment of the association between social disorganization and youth violence in rural areas

Objective: To study the association between social disorganization and youth violence rates in rural communities. Method: We employed rural Missouri counties (N = 106) as units of analysis, measured serious violent victimization data via hospital records, and the same measures of social disorganization as Osgood and Chambers (2000). Controlling for spatial autocorrelation, the negative binomial estimator was used to estimate the effects of social disorganization on youth violence rates. Results: Unlike Osgood and Chambers, we found only one of five social disorganization measures, the proportion of female-headed households, to be associated with rural youth violent victimization rates. Conclusion: Although most research on social disorganization theory has been undertaken on urban areas, a highly cited Osgood and Chambers (2000) study appeared to extend the generalize ability of social disorganization as an explanation of the distribution of youth violence to rural areas. Our results suggest otherwise. We provide several methodological and theoretical reasons why it may be too early to draw strong conclusions about the generalize ability of social disorganization to crime rates in rural communities.     

Poverty, Socioeconomic Change, Institutional Anomie, and Homicide

Objective. This study examined institutional anomie theory in the context of transitional Russia. Methods. We employed an index of negative socioeconomic change and measures of family, education, and polity to test the hypothesis that institutional strength conditions the effects of poverty and socioeconomic change on homicide rates. Results. As expected, the results of models estimated using negative binomial regression show direct positive effects of poverty and socioeconomic change and direct negative effects of family strength and polity on regional homicide rates. There was no support, however, for the hypothesis that stronger social institutions reduce the effects of poverty and socioeconomic change on violence. Conclusions. We interpret these results in the Russia-specific setting, concluding that Russia is a rich laboratory for examining the effects of social change on crime and that empirical research in other nations is important when assessing the generalizability of theories developed to explain crime and violence in the United States.     

Heavy Drinking and Suicide in Russia

Russian levels of alcohol consumption and suicide are among the highest in the world. While observers have long suspected an association between the two, they were unable to investigate this hypothesis until recently due to past Soviet secrecy and thus a lack of data. This study took advantage of the newly available data during the post-Soviet era to examine the cross-sectional association between heavy drinking and suicide mortality in Russia. Aggregate mortality data for the Russian regions (n = 78) for the year 2000 were used to measure heavy drinking and suicide rates. Government data were used to control for the regional economic situation and strength of social institutions. Ordinary Least Squares regression was employed to estimate the effect of a proxy for heavy drinking on overall and sex-specific age-adjusted suicide rates. The results showed a positive and significant association between the two, and the association held for overall, male and female rates. These results not only confirmed an association between heavy drinking and suicide in Russia, but when compared to findings from previous studies of other countries they led to the hypothesis that a nation's beverage preference may be as important as its wet/dry drinking culture in its sensitivity of suicide rates to alcohol consumption.     

What we know about social structure and homicide: a review of the theoretical and empirical literature

This article reviews what we have learned about social structure and homicide during the last 30 years, paying close attention to empirical tests of subculture, strain (both absolute and relative deprivation), and social disorganization theories. First, this review reveals that researchers have difficulty operationalizing culture in terms of values and instead often rely on regional location or group membership as a proxy for subculture. Though the findings relating subculture to homicide are inconsistent, however, culture should not be ignored. Second, the positive relationship between poverty and the spatial distribution of homicide rates is the most consistent finding in this literature, while empirical evidence of the effects of inequality on homicide is neither as strong nor as consistent. Finally, social disorganization is more consistent in explaining the variation of homicide rates than the subcultural and relative deprivation models, with elements of disorganization such as city size, family disruption, and heterogeneity all showing relatively consistent effects.