Trading Equity for Efficiency in Environmental Protection? Environmental Justice Effects from the SO2 Allowance Trading Program*

Objective. Arthur Okun made plain the fundamental conflict between efficiency and equity that arises in the pursuit of policy goals ( Okun, 1974 ). Although Okun was speaking about government tax and spending policy, the potential conflict between efficiency and equity is also manifest at the nexus of two of the most far‐reaching changes in the environmental policy arena: the adoption of market‐like tools for pollution control and the quest for environmental justice. The article assesses this potential tradeoff by determining whether the pursuit of efficiency through the Clean Air Act Amendment's (CAA) sulfur dioxide allowance trading program (ATP) inadvertently transfers pollution into poor and minority communities. Methods. I employ Probit, Tobit, and GLS models using data for all SO₂ trading activity between January 1995 and March 2009 to estimate whether allowance trading concentrates SO₂ emissions in poor communities and communities of color. When using these models, I control for sample selectivity and for possible bias stemming from the modifiable areal unit problem. Results. The ATP does not concentrate sulfur dioxide emissions in black or Hispanic communities. To the contrary, communities with high percentages of black and Hispanic residents experience fewer imports of sulfur dioxide. Allowance trading does transfer SO₂ emissions into poorly educated communities. Conclusions. There is no inherent tradeoff between efficiency and equity when using market‐based instruments for pollution control. Policymakers, however, might make an effort to design and implement future emissions trading programs in a manner that reduces the monitoring costs of tracking emissions trading. By reducing monitoring costs, policymakers may prevent the concentration of emissions in poorly educated communities while preserving the efficiency benefits of these instruments.     

Lies,Damned Lies,and Campaign Promises? Environmental Legislation in the 105th Congress*

Objective. The extent to which candidates for elected office keep their campaign promises holds great interest for citizens and has important consequences for the quality of democracy. However, we know very little about whether candidates actually keep these promises. This article examines the relationship between campaign promises and the subsequent legislative behavior of members of Congress in the area of environmental protection. Methods. Responses to the 1996 National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) are matched with roll‐call data on environmental issues from the 105th Congress. A series of bivariate probit models with selection are then used to assess the extent to which roll‐call votes are consistent with candidate policy statements in the NPAT. Results. We find that members of Congress vote consistent with their campaign promises 73 percent of the time, and that NPAT responses help to predict roll‐call votes even when controlling for party, race, gender, campaign contributions, and previous environmental voting record. We also find that the propensity to keep campaign promises varies systematically across types of legislators. Conclusions. Contrary to public perceptions, candidates for Congress routinely act to keep their campaign promises once elected, at least in the area of environmental protection policy.