Estimating the Conditional Error Distribution in Non‐parametric Regression

Abstract. We consider a general non‐parametric regression model, where the distribution of the error, given the covariate, is modelled by a conditional distribution function. For the estimation, a kernel approach as well as the (kernel based) empirical likelihood method are discussed. The latter method allows for incorporation of additional information on the error distribution into the estimation. We show weak convergence of the corresponding empirical processes to Gaussian processes and compare both approaches in asymptotic theory and by means of a simulation study.     

EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS AND MILITARY SERVICE: AN ANALYSIS OF ENLISTMENT,REENLISTMENT, AND VETERANS' BENEFIT USAGE 1991–2005*

Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) educational benefits are a prime recruiting tool in today's all‐volunteer military. This paper studies the effects of changes in education benefits using data of the period 1990–2005. Higher benefits lead to higher separation due to both pure incentive effects and by attracting more college‐oriented youth into military service. We deal with potential selection issues by distinguishing between anticipated and unanticipated benefit changes. Higher education benefits are associated with higher separation from the Army and Air Force, but not the other services. A $10,000 increase in MGIB benefits is estimated to increase usage by about 5 percentage points, but the duration of usage is estimated to be insensitive to benefit levels. (JEL H52, I21, J24)     

MODELING INFORMALITY FORMALLY: HOUSEHOLDS AND FIRMS

Informality is widespread in most developing countries. In Latin America, 50% of salaried employees work informally. Three stylized facts characterize informality: (1) small firms tend to operate informally while large firms tend to operate formally; (2) unskilled workers tend to be informal while skilled ones have formal jobs; (3) ceteris paribus, secondary workers (a worker other than the household head) are less likely to operate formally than primary workers. We develop a model that accounts for all these facts. In our model, both heterogeneous firms and workers have preferences over the sector they operate and choose optimally whether to function formally or informally. There are two labor markets, one formal and the other informal, and both firms and workers act unconstrained in them. By contrast, a prominent feature of the preexisting literature is that workers' decisions play no role in determining the equilibrium of the economy. In our model, policies that reduce the supply of workers in the informal labor market at given wages will increase the level of formality in the economy. This has noteworthy implications for the design of social programs in developing countries. We also show that an increase in the participation of secondary workers would tend to raise the level of informality in the economy. (JEL J24, J33)     

LEADING WITH(OUT) SACRIFICE? A PUBLIC‐GOODS EXPERIMENT WITH A PRIVILEGED PLAYER

We analyze two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player. (JEL C91, C92, H40, H41)