DISARMING THE OPPOSITION: THE PRESIDENT, THE PUBLIC, AND THE INF TREATY

Data from a nationwide opinion survey are used to test the propositionthat President Reagan's sponsorship of the INF treaty effectivelydisarmed the opposition that hard-liners would normally haveregistered against the treaty. The data are consistent withthis interpretation. That is, the president's endorsement ofthe treaty had only a modest impact on those who perceived theSoviets as relatively nonthreatening, but it had a much morepronounced impact on those who viewed the Soviets as threatening.These results shed new light on the extent to which and theconditions under which Americans are willing to set aside theirown policy predilections and follow along behind presidentialinitiatives in the international arena.     

SOME LIKE IT HOT: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES TO GROUP FEELING THERMOMETERS

In this paper we explore the nature and causes of individualdifferences in the use of feeling thermometer items to evaluatesocial groups. Some respondents have a general tendency to assignhigher overall temperature readings and some tend to use a widerrange of the temperature scale. These tendencies are partiallyunderstandable in terms of the respondent's evaluations of socialgroups, but other important predictors are identified. Methodsof adjusting feeling thermometer scores to account for individualdifferences are explored, using data from the 1984 AmericanNational Election Study. The conclusion is that some sort ofadjustment is probably useful for those studying supportersof conservative groups, though such a procedure may not be neededfor those who focus on liberal groups.     

Judgments of the Carter-Reagan Debate: The Eyes of the Beholders

In line with social-psychological theory and with findings fromprior analyses of the impact of televised campaign debates,the 1980 Carter-Reagan debate seems to have been interpretedlargely in light of preexisting candidate preferences. Knowledgeof whether a viewer intended to vote for Carter or Reagan and,for undecided voters, knowledge of position on the liberal-conservativecontinuum, permit accurate predictions to be made of judgmentsof who won the debate.     

MEASURING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT: THE PERILS OF POINT ESTIMATION

It has been reported that 30% of American adults support the"sociomoral platform of the Moral Majority" (Simpson, 1983).We lodge several criticisms of this estimate and/or the wayit has subsequently been interpreted, involving the treatmentof "don't know" responses, the selection of response categorycutting points, the passage of time, the effects of questionwording, and substance. We derive a much different estimateof public support for the Moral Majority platform in the sameyear, but our more basic conclusion is simply that public opinionon this issue, as on most complex issues, cannot be fairly reflectedby a single number.     

Why Does Presidential Popularity Decline? A Test of the Expectation/Disillusion Theory

According to the "expectation/disillusion" interpretation ofthe decline of presidential popularity over time, popularitydeclines as unrealistically high expectations of presidentialperformance inevitably give way to more realistic assessments.This paper puts that interpretation and several specific aspectsof it to the test through analysis of data from a series ofnationwide polls conducted between 1977 and 1979.     

Is the Audience the Message? A Note on LBJ's Vietnam Statements

Do politicians still tailor their messages for specific audiences,or has mass media coverage led them to homogenize their messages?Contentanalysis of 77 of Lyndon B. Johnson's public statements aboutVietnam showed that, depending on the audience, he did varythe content—which suggests that to some extentthe audienceis the message.     

Knowledge and Opinions About the Iranian Crisis: A Reconsideration of Three Models

This paper tests Gamson and Modigliani's enlightenment, mainstream,and cognitive consistency models of the linkage between knowledgeand foreign policy opinions. Data from a survey of Lexington,Kentucky residents shortly after the seizure of the Americanembassy in Teheran, Iran in late 1979 indicate that althoughthe mainstream model performs somewhat better than its two competitors,none of the Gamson-Modigliani models adequately explains publicopinion concerning American policy options. Concluding discussioncenters on the possible reasons for the weak showing of themodels.     

Race, Gender, and Opinion Toward Black and Female Presidential Candidates

Using data from the 1974 and 1978 General Social Surveys, publicopinion toward blacks and women as presidential candidates wasexplored. We tested the hypotheses that white males would beleast likely to support presidential candidates from both groups,while black females would be the most likely to express thissupport. We found that although blacks in general were moresupportive of black candidacies than were whites, women werenot consistently more supportive of female candidates. Whileblack women were more likely than black males to support femalecandidates, among whites few gender differences were found.     

Presidential Popularityand Presidential Elections

Current Research This section of POQ is reserved for brief reportsof research in progress, discussions of unresolved problems,methodological studies, and public opinion data not extensivelyanalyzed or interpreted. Succinct case histories are welcomed,as well as hypotheses and insights that may be useful to otherstudents of public opinion. Usually, materialin this sectionis shorter, more informal, and more tentative than in precedingpages.     

Expectation/Disillusion and Presidential Popularity: The Reagan Experience

The Sigelman-Knight analysis of the "expectation/disillusion"interpretation of recurring declines in presidential popularityis replicated with data on the Reagan presidency. There is aconnection between Reagan's popularity and expectations aboutwhat he would be able to accomplish, but (just as was the caseduring the Carter presidency, and directly counter to predictions)it was the more highly educated whose expectations of presidentialperformance were initially highest. Moreover, as time passedthe size of the education-based gap in expectations of Reaganincreased over time. These findings leave the expectation/disillusioninterpretation in considerable doubt.