政党统合的力量:党、政治资本与草根NGO的发展:基于Z省H市的多案例比较研究

本文旨在探讨转型时期党对于草根NGO的独特影响机制。在整合前人相关研究的基础上,通过对Z省H市两个草根环保NGO的多案例比较,本文发现党对于NGO的影响存在一条与政府不同的独特机制。与传统资源视角和合法性视角所认为的不同,本文认为,党在拓宽资源渠道、增强政治合法性方面对于NGO的影响与政府相比并不存在显著优势,然而唯独党可以通过统合手段,从制度层面给予NGO领导人以政治身份,从而增强其政治资本、扩展其社会网络,为NGO的发展提供更加宽松的制度环境。这一点单一的政府部门难以企及。本文不仅深化了学术界对于国家-社会关系层面更加细致的理解,而且在更广泛层面暗示了与国家的紧密联系并不必然意味着NGO自主性的缺失。未来的研究应当将关注点放在这种关系对于公共治理所造成的实际影响,而非NGO的独立性和自主性本身。     

Global Civil Society Under the New INGO Regulatory Law: A Comparative Case Study on Two INGOs in China

VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations - This paper tries to explain why similar International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) have different scopes under...     

From decentralization to integration: the development of social welfare services for disabled veterans in China

China's current social preferential treatment system for disabled veterans began in the war years and has developed during periods of peace. However, there are multiple barriers, such as decentralized cooperation between central and local governments, which prevent the state from providing effective welfare services. The establishment of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs can be seen as an effective attempt to resolve the decentralization of management, similar to relevant legislative work and establishing provincial-level institutions in local governments. This article focuses on how central and local governments attempt to break though the barriers to providing effective welfare services for disabled veterans in China and integrate decentralized responsibility to cooperate in the management system of welfare services for disabled veterans. The integration of welfare services and the rational use of social security as a platform can build a new mechanism of preferential treatment.     

Seeking Credibility from Uncertainty: How Formal Cooptation Institution Unleashes Outspoken NGOs

Uncertain political boundaries and formal cooptation institutions often make NGOs in China self-censor on sensitive issues. A growing body of literature has focused on various strategies NGOs proactively adopt to circumvent formal restrictions and manage the risk of participation. However, a comparative case study from a four-month fieldwork in this paper reveals a previously neglected aspect of state-NGO interaction, i.e., how do NGOs perceive and process the information they get? We find that endorsement outside of the formal institution—a retired official in our case—is not perceived as credible because the retired official does not have to bear the consequence of miscalculation. On the contrary, endorsement from local supervision institution is perceived as credible. Paradoxically, the credibility comes from the institutional design that originally intends to make restriction and monitoring effective. Our study suggests that while NGOs have various ways to seek endorsement, not all of them are perceived as credible. State, as the creator of uncertainty in the first place, is also the ultimate solution for it.