Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations

We consider a normal-form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. The actions representing other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the sovereign, individual control of the players. We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are stated and we identify conditions under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent. We apply this framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly, typically, a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium. The paradox vanishes if the cartel attains a leadership position. For international pollution abatement treaties, cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.     

Sampling strategy for optimal classification into one of two correlated normal populations

A unit ω is to be classified into one of two correlated homoskedastic normal populations by linear discriminant function known as W classification statistic [T.W. Anderson, An asymptotic expansion of the distribution of studentized classification statistic, Ann. Statist. 1 (1973), pp. 964–972; T.W. Anderson, An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis, 2nd edn, Wiley, New York, 1984; G.J. Mclachlan, Discriminant Analysis and Statistical Pattern Recognition, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1992]. The two populations studied here are two different states of the same population, like two different states of a disease where the population is the population of diseased patient. When a sample unit is observed in both the states (populations), the observations made on it (which form a pair) become correlated. A training sample is unbalanced when not all sample units are observed in both the states. Paired and also unbalanced samples are natural in studies related to correlated populations. S. Bandyopadhyay and S. Bandyopadhyay [Choosing better training sample for classifying an individual into one of two correlated normal populations, Calcutta Statist. Assoc. Bull. 54(215–216) (2003), pp. 167–180] studied the effect of unbalanced training sample structure on the performance of W statistics in the univariate correlated normal set-up for finding optimal sampling strategy for a better classification rate. In this study, the results are extended to the multivariate case with discussion on application in real scenario.     

Influence of soil properties on street tree attributes in Singapore

Urban Ecosystems - Soil quality is thought to be a primary driver of street tree performance and thus a major concern for urban forest growth, health and longevity. This research was conducted to...     

Strategic behavior under partial cooperation

We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash’s best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return.     

Goodness-of-Fit Testing for Exponential Polynomial Growth Curves

A goodness-of-fit test is proposed for the family of exponential polynomial growth curve models (EPGCM; Heinen, 1999 Heinen , M. ( 1999 ). Analytical growth equations and their Genstat 5 equivalents . Netherlands J. Agricult. Sci. 47 : 67 – 89 .[Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), which has wide applications in different areas of science. The exponential growth curve model (EGCM), the most prominent member of the EPGCM family, is a simple and biologically meaningful growth model. Other members of the EPGCM family also cover many realistic growth processes. Thus, a goodness-of-fit test for the EPGCM class has substantial practical value. The goodness-of-fit test developed here is based on the properties of finite differences. The performance of the theory developed is illustrated through simulation and analysis of real data.